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UNLOCKING PROGRESSIVE
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: THE
BLACK AND BROWN HDFC KEY
GREGORY E. LOUIS*
For decades, progressive corporate law scholarship has lamented
corporate law’s captivity to the neoliberal conception of business
corporations. For progressive scholars, corporate governance doctrines
based in neoliberalism have been a formula for anomie as they reduce
corporations — and especially publicly traded ones — to a profitgenerating device for equity investors, disregarding anything and anyone
else. Progressive scholarship has also criticized neoliberal corporate
law on communitarian grounds, namely, for its denial that corporations
have any social responsibility or public obligations. But to date, the
progressive corporate law critique and corresponding reform program
has failed to transform mainstream corporate law. This failure flows
from progressive scholarship’s perpetuation of neoliberalism’s premise
that corporations exist to generate wealth. This Article argues that the
key to unlocking progressive corporate governance is to base reform on
New York City’s housing development fund corporations (“HDFCs”).
These are business corporations formed by low-income households of
color in the 1970s and 1980s so that they could secure themselves with
housing denied to them by markets. The HDFC is best suited as the
measure for progressive reform because it has been especially harmed
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by the neoliberal corporate governance paradigm and is a proven
antidote for neoliberal reduction: against the operation of an aggressive
market in the global capital of real estate and finance, HDFCs have
successfully preserved their Black and Brown shareholders from
disinvestment and displacement. As such, the HDFC advances the
progressive perspective by supplying it with an understanding of
shareholding that combines the public company equity investor with the
sweat equity stakeholder. For concrete reforms advancing a progressive
project, this Article proposes that corporate law adopt more searching
judicial review of board decisions modelled on anti-discrimination and
Massachusetts corporate law and that corporate law be amended to
include “sweat equity” investors in governance. With such, corporate
law can reflect pluralism, stand as an ally to social movements, and
advance the original social function of corporations, obscured during
this neoliberal age.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The plight of Black and Brown business corporations, typified by New
York City’s Housing Development Fund Corporations (“HDFCs”),
illustrates how the law of corporate governance suffers from enthrallment to
business, and to a limited understanding of “business” at that.1 Under this
dominant paradigm, corporate governance doctrines flow from the
proposition that business corporations exist for equity investors to earn
money from their activities: there is scarcely a controversy in the field free
of this supposition.2 As such, the law, reduced to “law-and-economics”
finance trends, compels boards of directors solely to look after the wealth of
shareholders.3 It frees the board from considering any other interest aside
from shareholders’ wealth.
Progressive scholars recognize neoliberal corporate law as a social and
normative problem.4 The social problem is that corporations, with the public
benefit of limited liability, do not have any corresponding public duties to
corporate stakeholders, such as employees.5 Corporations can exploit a
tremendous public benefit to manipulate, destroy, and alienate.6 The
normative problem is that neoliberal governance doctrines are not, properly
speaking, law. As Adam Winkler writes in Corporate Law or The Law of
Business?: Stakeholders and Corporate Governance at the End of History,7
the dominant neoliberal model — the law-and-economics “nexus of
contract” approach — argues that “[t]he terms of corporate activity are . . .
effectively set by markets, not by law.”8 Winkler locates some limits serving
to protect non-stakeholder corporate constituents in other areas of law such
as consumer, employment, and securities law.9 But by looking beyond
corporate law codes for this protection, Winkler indirectly concedes that

1. See Roberta Romano, After the Revolution in Corporate Law, 55 J. LEGAL EDUC.
342, 345–46 (2005) (describing the methodological dominance of modern finance in
corporate law study).
2. See id.
3. See discussion infra Part II.
4. See discussion infra Section III.A.
5. See Kent Greenfield, If Corporations Are People, They Should Act Like It,
ATLANTIC (Feb. 1, 2015), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2015/02/if-corp
orations-are-people-they-should-act-like-it/385034/ (describing opposition to shareholder primacy theory).
6. See infra notes 62–64 and accompanying text.
7. Adam Winkler, Corporate Law or the Law of Business?: Stakeholders and
Corporate Governance at the End of History, 67 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 109 (2004).
8. Id. at 109–10.
9. Id. at 111.
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corporate law, as such, does not serve to prescribe and limit.10 Similarly, in
Citizenship and the Corporation,11 Ian B. Lee uses political theory to
supplement the gap of meaning in corporate law that the same “nexus of
contracts” view has produced.12 For Lee, political theory — the concept of
citizenship — is needed to make sense of and legitimize power actually
exercised by corporate officials that the economic reduction of the
corporation omits or obscures.13 As with Winkler’s, Lee’s argument
squarely assumes that the neoliberal understanding of corporate law fails to
account for many of its aspects.14
But to date, this progressive challenge has not transformed corporate law.
One reason progressive challenges to corporate law have failed is that even
progressive arguments have perpetuated neoliberalism by proposing reforms
assuming that corporations exist to generate profit.15 But in doing so,
progressive challenges to corporate law have revealed their own normative
problem of prescribing more than they are describing and defining,16
weakening the whole project. For accepting neoliberalism’s reductive
premise delegitimizes progressive corporate law from the standpoint of
American legal realism, or the supposition that legitimate law must be
understood as the empirical reflection of ordinary human activity.17 This is
10. See id. at 132–33 (outlining how progressives have used other bodies of law to
regulate “corporate conduct,” like labor law, environmental law, workplace safety law,
consumer protection law, and securities law).
11. Ian B. Lee, Citizenship and the Corporation, 34 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 129 (2009).
12. Id. at 131.
13. See id. at 156–58 (arguing the benefits of analyzing the corporation via “a
political-theoretical lens” lie in uncovering the corporate officials’ power, whereas
viewing the corporation through the “nexus-of-contracts” approach “either denies the
phenomenon of power as an empirical matter or else conceptualizes it as residual slack”).
14. See id. at 161–62 (explaining that the theoretical conceptualization of a
corporation matters from the standpoint of culture because the dominant paradigm allows
managers, “when confronted with a business decision raising an ethical issue involving
the rights of a third party, not to approach the issue from the standpoint of ethics but
rather to adopt one of two rather different frameworks of analysis [an amoral or
latitudinarian one]”).
15. See discussion infra Section III.B.
16. Cf. Lyman Johnson, Re-Enchanting the Corporation, 1 WM. & MARY BUS. L.
REV. 83, 98–99 (2010) [hereinafter Johnson, Re-Enchanting the Corporation] (arguing
that corporate law’s recognition of institutional pluralism within the realm of business
would make corporate law more “descriptively accurate” in that it would reflect private
actors who “are not altogether self-seeking in business dealings” but rather “value
integrity and consciously strive to serve others”).
17. See id.; see also RAYMOND WACKS, PHILOSOPHY OF LAW: A VERY SHORT
INTRODUCTION 93–96 (1st ed. 2006) (describing critical legal studies as originating in
the United States as a “latter-day version” of American realism, a philosophy of
empiricism); AMERICAN LEGAL REALISM xiv (William W. Fisher III et al. eds., 1993).
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because many business corporations do not exist, simply or even primarily,
to make money for their investors and stakeholders.18 Rather, like the
HDFC,19 many business corporations are formed to protect their investors
from the operation of markets.20
This Article argues that the key to reviving progressive corporate law, as
a corrective to neoliberal reduction, is using the example of HDFCs to unlock
reform, in much the same way that Black constitutionalism has brought the
American political order to fulfilment in Nikole Hannah-Jones’ acclaimed
argument.21 There are three reasons why the progressive corporate law
project can be revived by the HDFC. First, HDFCs are fully business
corporations, governed by the same procedures, rules, and principles as any
other,22 except that they reject economic rationality as conventionally
understood. Instead, they are based on a communitarian ethos associated
with people of color that regards social solidarity as a basis for strength.23
This perspective serves as a cipher key concretizing progressive corporate
law’s principle of communitarianism,24 but in a way that also helps corporate
law to overcome its tendency toward white ethnocentric presumption, or
“perspectivelessness.”25 The HDFC take on rationality is what civil rights
18. See discussion infra Section IV.A; see also Lynn A. Stout, Why We Should Stop
Teaching Dodge v. Ford, 3 VA. L & BUS. REV. 163, 164–66 (2008) [hereinafter Stout,
Why We Should Stop Teaching Dodge v. Ford]. In that article, Stout argues that Dodge
v. Ford — or the case commonly cited and taught for the proposition that a business
corporation is organized and carried on primarily for the profit of the stockholders — is
bad law because it is an inaccurate description of corporate charters and bylaws,
corporate statutes, and case law. As will be clearer in this Article, I agree with Stout that
Dodge v. Ford is bad law to the extent it says all corporations are, or should be, organized
for profit; indeed, I cite low-income housing cooperatives as a counterexample. But her
observations in the introduction to her paper demonstrate that Dodge v. Ford is shorthand
for a view of corporations, amplified by Milton Friedman, that has dominated corporate
law thinking of the past forty years. In that sense, it is more “the law” than any other
source that she cited. For a discussion of this, see infra Section III.B.
19. See discussion infra Section IV.A.
20. See discussion infra Section IV.A.
21. See Nikole Hannah-Jones, Our Democracy’s Founding Ideals Were False When
They Were Written. Black Americans Have Fought to Make Them True, N.Y. TIMES
(Aug. 14, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2019/08/14/magazine/black-hist
ory-american-democracy.html (illuminating the necessary role Black Americans have
played throughout U.S. history in reconciling the inherent contradictions and hypocrisy
surrounding the drafting of the U.S. Constitution).
22. See discussion infra Section IV.A.
23. See discussion infra Section IV.A.
24. See discussion infra Section IV.A.
25. See Kimberlé Williams Crenshaw, Foreword: Toward A Race-Conscious
Pedagogy in Legal Education, 11 NAT’ L BLACK L.J. 1, 2, 12 (1988) (defining
“perspectivelessness” as the natural consequence of “positing an analytical stance that
has no specific cultural, political, or class characteristics”).
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scholarship has termed as a “counterstory,”26 such a term is generally lacking
in corporate law.27 Second, HDFCs especially illustrate the harm of applying
a neoliberal governance framework based on one type of business
corporation — the public company — to all business corporations. As we
shall see later, with corporations like HDFCs, neoliberal corporate
governance is a formula for board corruption that allows subversion from
within.28 Third, in having allowed their Black and Brown owners to
withstand disinvestment and displacement in the global capital of real estate
and finance,29 HDFCs prove that business corporations do in fact counter
markets, and quite effectively. Thus, the HDFC supplies progressive
corporate law with a concrete, American example of an effective business
corporation based on communitarian rationality, a concept thus far absent
from its analysis.30
This Article elaborates the HDFC key in five parts. In Part II, this Article
summarizes and historicizes the current neoliberal corporate governance
paradigm to elaborate on the problem that progressive corporate law reacts
to. So that this summary can be most applicable to the HDFC, this Article
uses New York law. However, this discussion will have more general
applicability since New York law necessarily brings up Delaware decisional
law, as is customary in New York jurisprudence.31
In Part III, this Article summarizes the progressive critique of
neoliberalism governance and explains its failure to change the law. First,
26. See George A. Martinez, Legal Indeterminacy, Judicial Discretion and the
Mexican-American Litigation Experience: 1930–1980, 27 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 555, 614–
15 (“One way to help judges break down mindset, broaden their perspectives, and
promote justice in civil rights cases, is to provide counterstories — i.e., explain how
decisions were not inevitable. Through this process judges can ‘overcome ethnocentrism
and the unthinking conviction that [their] way of seeing the world is the only one — that
the way things are is inevitable, natural, just, and best’ and thereby avoid moral error
when deciding any civil rights case.”).
27. See Mae Kuykendall, No Imagination: The Marginal Role of Narrative in
Corporate Law, 55 BUFF. L. REV. 537, 589 (2007) (arguing that narrative is largely
absent from corporate law and does not have a role since business is about efficiency).
As will become clear in this Article, I disagree with Kuykendall’s view on the role of
narrative in changing corporate law.
28. See discussion infra Section IV.C.
29. See SAMUEL STEIN, CAPITAL CITY: GENTRIFICATION AND THE REAL ESTATE
STATE 95–115 (2019) (describing features of New York City as a neoliberal real estate
state); DAVID MADDEN & PETER MARCUSE, IN DEFENSE OF HOUSING: THE POLITICS OF
CRISIS 26–34 (2016) (describing the era of “hyper-commodification” in New York City
real estate).
30. See discussion infra Section IV.B.
31. See, e.g., City Trading Fund v. Nye, 72 N.Y.S.3d 371, 376 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Cnty.
2018) (observing that North Carolina, like New York, generally follows and applies
Delaware corporate law).
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in Section III.A, this Article summarizes the key points of the progressive
critique of neoliberal corporate law. In Section III.B, this Article addresses
the failure of the progressive corporate law movement to inspire reform in
terms of its critique. Ultimately, it attributes the movement’s failure to
challenge the function of corporations to its reliance on theory, tweaks, and
subtlety.
In Part IV, this Article introduces the HDFC key. First, in Section IV.A,
this Article frames these entities as the paradigmatic counter-market business
entity by historicizing them and explaining the particular Black and Brown
economic rationality driving them. Then in Section IV.B, this Article
describes how, despite the clear difference between HDFCs and public
companies, standard neoliberal corporate governance nonetheless applies to
HDFCs wholesale. This Article ends Part IV with a case study, presented in
Section IV.C, demonstrating the baleful effects of applying standard
governance doctrines to such entities.
In Part V, this Article summarizes two existing progressive proposals for
reforming corporate law outside of the public company context: the
nonprofit charitable corporation and the public benefit corporation. It
demonstrates that their limitations prevent them from achieving progressive
corporate law’s goal of liberating corporate governance from corporate
finance.
Finally, in Part VI, this Article proposes solutions for the current law’s
shortcoming. It argues that the HDFC — and the measure of Black and
Brown economic rationality — should be the standard for progressive
corporate reform. Reforms inspired by the HDFC would push the law to
serve all business corporations, including those formed to counter markets,
and not just public companies, by: (i) replacing the business judgment rule
(“BJR”) with more searching review of board actions affecting such countermarket entities; and (ii) amending New York’s Business Corporation Law
(“BCL”) to modify the norm of board supremacy32 by granting shareholders
of such entities more statutory rights of participation. This Article concludes
by arguing that such HDFC-inspired reform not only would enrich corporate
law with more pluralism but also would grow the law from its original, public
roots.33
32. N.Y. BUS. CORP. LAW § 701 (McKinney 2021).
33. See Naomi R. Lamoreaux & William J. Novak, Corporations and American

Democracy: An Introduction, in CORPORATIONS AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 7–10
(Naomi R. Lamoreaux & William J. Novak eds., 2017) (stating that after U.S.
independence, new state governments started relying on corporations as they helped fund
public works projects for tax breaks); LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF
AMERICAN LAW 159 (4th ed. 2019) (chronicling that, before 1800, few corporations were
business corporations and that almost all colonial corporations were churches, charities,
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II. THE NEOLIBERAL CORPORATE GOVERNANCE PARADIGM
It is well-established that in the business corporation, there is a sharp
division between ownership and control.34 Under the standard model,
shareholders, those contributing capital to propel the corporation’s business,
enjoy profit from the business with their exposure cabined to equity, or the
residual value after every other claim has been satisfied.35 The cost of this
freedom from risk is the requirement that shareholders cede control to
professional directors whom they elect.36 Shareholders’ current role in
corporate governance is limited to electing directors, approving matters that
would fundamentally alter or end the corporation, and suing corporations to
enforce their collective interests against managers’ disregard.37 Managers,
in turn, enjoy the full power of control over the corporation’s affairs and
activities but do not necessarily share in equity; they profit primarily in their
salaries.38 And so one finds in corporate law a neat framework reverberating
or cities or boroughs); Ronald E. Seavoy, The Public Service Origins of the American
Business Corporation, 52 BUS. HIST. REV. 30, 31–33 (1978) (highlighting that corporate
privilege was granted to almost any association that worked toward the public benefit
and emphasizing that public corporations no longer have important civic
responsibilities); KENT GREENFIELD, THE FAILURE OF CORPORATE LAW: FUNDAMENTAL
FLAWS AND PROGRESSIVE POSSIBILITIES 1 (2006) [hereinafter GREENFIELD, THE FAILURE
OF CORPORATE LAW] (“For much of the history of the United States, ‘public’
corporations were deemed to have important civic responsibilities. At the beginning of
the twenty-first century, however, ‘public corporation’ is among the most misleading
terms in all of law or business.”).
34. See Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director Primacy: The Means and Ends of
Corporate Governance, 97 NW. U.L. REV. 547, 559–60 (2003) [hereinafter Bainbridge,
Director Primacy] (“As Berle and Means famously demonstrated, most public
corporations are marked by a separation of ownership and control. Corporate law
effectively carves this separation into stone.”); FRANKLIN A. GEVURTZ, CORPORATION
LAW 179 (2d ed. 2010) (describing corporate governance as following a republican, or
representative model, in contrast to partnerships’ Athenian, or direct democracy model,
of governance).
35. See, e.g., Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Business Judgement Rule as Abstention
Doctrine, 57 VAND. L. REV. 83, 110–11 (2004) [hereinafter Bainbridge, The Business
Judgment Rule As Abstention Doctrine]; J. MARK RAMSEYER, BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS
242–43 (2012) (describing the economic justifications for this allocation).
36. See Bainbridge, Director Primacy, supra note 34, at 568–69 (characterizing
shareholder control rights as weak and “scarcely qualify[ing] as part of corporate
governance”); RAMSEYER, supra note 35, at 242–43; see also MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT §
8.01(b) (2002) (AM. BAR ASS’N, amended 2020).
37. See Bainbridge, Director Primacy, supra note 34, at 569; D. Gordon Smith, The
Shareholder Primacy Norm, 23 J. CORP. L. 277, 284–86 (1998).
38. RAMSEYER, supra note 35, at 242–43. In the United States, federal law has
developed toward aligning manager compensation with performance. See REINIER
KRAAKMAN ET AL., THE ANATOMY OF CORPORATE LAW: A COMPARATIVE AND
FUNCTIONAL APPROACH § 3.3.2 (3d ed. 2017) (discussing amendments to tax and
securities law tying executive compensation to performance and granting shareholders
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with good sense, but lacking an origin by which it can be assessed.
The origin story is this: the distinction between ownership and control
arose as a premise of limited liability, but nowadays is considered a
“cornerstone” of Anglo-American corporate law.39 As framed in Victorian
debates about the enactment of England and Wales’ Limited Liability Act of
1855,40 limited liability arose to encourage people of limited means to invest
their savings in business, or wealthy people to invest in businesses run by
such people.41 The historicity of this necessity is debated among scholars,42
but limited liability’s role in democratizing investment stands undisputed.43
Limited liability served this function because, despite Nicholas Butler
Murray’s potentially hyperbolic and famous observation,44 before limited
liability statutes, a person investing in the dominant business entity and the
partnership risked total ruin if the business incurred liabilities beyond the
value of the entity’s assets.45 In such a situation, the partners were personally
an advisory vote on executive performance).
39. Philip I. Blumberg, Limited Liability and Corporate Groups, 11 J. CORP. L. 573,
574–75 (1986); see Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Limited Liability and the
Corporation, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 89, 93–97 (1985).
40. Limited Liability Act 1855, 18 & 19 Vict. c. 133 (Eng.).
41. See Paul Halpern et al., An Economic Analysis of Limited Liability in
Corporation Law, 30 U. TORONTO L.J. 117, 118 (1980) (stating John Stuart Mill
advanced a theory that “the rich would be more likely to invest money in business
ventures” of the middle class if there were limited liability because if the business failed,
they would not be targeted by the creditors); GEVURTZ, supra note 34, at 26–35.
42. See, e.g., Lawrence E. Mitchell, Close Corporations Reconsidered, 63 TUL. L.
REV. 1143, 1155–56 (1989) (arguing that there is little history supporting the notion that
limited liability is needed to incentivize investment); John Morley, The Common Law
Corporation: The Power of the Trust in Anglo-American Business History, 116 COLUM.
L. REV. 2145, 2146 (2016) (contending that corporate form is not “the exclusive
historical source of . . . legal powers,” such as limited liability, as these were available in
the common law business trust).
43. See FRIEDMAN, supra note 33, at 160–62 (describing the growth of corporations
in the mid-1800s from partnerships with “two or three partners, often related by blood or
marriage” to a more efficient “form for organizing a business, legally open to all,” which
increased competition in the free market).
44. “The limited liability corporation is the greatest single discovery of modern
times. Even steam and electricity are less important than the limited liability company.”
Stephen M. Bainbridge, William D. Warren Professor of L., Univ. of L.A. Sch. of L.,
Reflections on Twenty Years of Law Teaching: Remarks at the Rutter Award Ceremony
(Apr. 16, 2008), in UCLA SCHOOL OF LAW: PUBLIC LAW & LEGAL THEORY RESEARCH
PAPER SERIES 1, 8 (2008) (quoting Nicholas Murray Butler, President, Colum. Univ.).
45. Of course, this risk of ruin had long been reduced with some unincorporated
entities, such as joint-stock companies based on their diffused ownership, and the legal
requirement that debts be first satisfied out of business assets before turning to
individuals. See Mason v. Am. Express Co., 334 F.2d 392, 401 (2d Cir. 1964)
(describing theoretical liability of the unincorporated joint-stock association’s individual
members under New York law as practically unimportant and virtually identical to
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liable beyond their share of the partnership.46 So before the enactment of
limited corporations, investment in a company was attractive only to
individuals who either wished to take an active role in management (so that
they might be in control of risk reduction) or who were sufficiently
knowledgeable about the character of management so as to be comfortable
placing trust in others.47 The old regime excluded pure capitalists as we now
understand them: gilded folks, wholly ignorant of a business’ particulars,
who contribute money solely for a return on investment.48
Because limited liability is connected to encouraging investment by
pure capitalists,49 it makes sense that the enterprise should be directed by
experts who should, as a result of this expertise, enjoy complete freedom to
grow investments through risks.50 Put in contemporary terms, modern
corporate governance, and its centerpiece doctrine of the BJR,51 is rooted in,
and informed by, the exact sort of business organization whose shares have
long been traded on public markets: the entity in which one takes an
theoretical liability of the same shareholders under section 630 of New York Business
Corporation Law); see also Morley, supra note 42, at 2174–75 (arguing that the common
law business trust also provided protection against limited liability).
46. See Halpern et al., supra note 41, at 118; cf. J OHN M ICKLETHWAIT & A DRIAN
WOOLDRIDGE, THE COMPANY: A S HORT HISTORY OF A REVOLUTIONARY IDEA 50–
54 (2003) (recounting the origins of limited liability corporations in the mid-19th
century).
47. See Stephen B. Presser, Commentary, Thwarting the Killing of the Corporation:
Limited Liability, Democracy, and Economics, 87 NW. U.L. REV. 148, 155–56 (1992)
(explaining how limited liability is credited for keeping markets democratic and
accessible to modest investors).
48. See id. (discussing New York’s adoption of limited liability as a means of
democratizing investment).
49. See id.; Halpern et al., supra note 41, at 118 (discussing Victorian proponents of
limited liability who argued that it would encourage middle and working classes
“otherwise discouraged from investing by the large variance in possible investment
outcomes under an unlimited liability regime” to invest and would encourage “the
rich . . . to invest money in business ventures involving members of the middle and
working classes” if they were certain that the middle and working classes would become
“the chief targets of creditors’ attention”).
50. This is Bainbridge’s basic justification for the busines judgment rule. See
Bainbridge, The Business Judgment Rule As Abstention Doctrine, supra note 35, at 110–
11, 123 (discussing how “encouraging optimal risk taking is necessary” and how judicial
abstinence is needed to ensure directors are not “skew[ed] . . . away from optimal risk
taking”). Indeed, even in the corporate law debate about who “owns” the corporation —
shareholders, managers, directors, or stakeholders — all submit that managers should be
those in control. See WALTER A. EFFROSS, CORPORATE G OVERNANCE: PRINCIPLES
AND P RACTICES §§ 1.02, 1.05 (2010).
51. See Bainbridge, The Business Judgment Rule As Abstention Doctrine, supra note
35, at 83 (“The business judgment rule pervades every aspect of state corporate law, from
the review of allegedly negligent decisions by directors, to self-dealing transactions, to
board decisions to seek dismissal of shareholder litigation, and so on.”).

2021

UNLOCKING PROGRESSIVE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE

89

ownership interest purely for the sake of making money from its activities.52
This last point invites a brief excursus on the BJR. In its classical form,
the BJR is the legal doctrine under which a court eschews substantive review
of a corporate board’s decisions unless shareholders can show that a board
violated its fiduciary duties of care and loyalty, or proceeded without good
faith, in making those decisions.53 And even these standards are far less
rigorous than they initially appear, as scholars have observed how the duty
of care, since its highpoint in the Delaware Supreme Court’s decision of
Smith v. Van Gorkom,54 has become dead letter.55 So ultimately, acts of
boards that conform with proper procedure, including the aspects of
procedure relating to conflicts of interest and minimal attentiveness, enjoy
legal impunity.56
Eminent corporate scholar Stephen M. Bainbridge has explained the BJR
in the same terms as those justifying limited liability,57 existing precisely
because it encourages the risk-taking that public company shareholders rely
upon to grow their investment.58 But the BJR applies only insofar as
directors are doing what they are supposed to under the bargain with
shareholders accounting for the separation of ownership and control:
minding shareholders’ wealth.59 Shareholders’ theoretical preference for the
BJR ends at precisely the point where directors’ decisions are motivated by
considerations other than shareholder wealth: self-dealing or a desire to
defraud shareholders.60 In other terms, within public companies the BJR
actually performs the very function that bringing shareholders into the
52. See Bainbridge, The Business Judgment Rule As Abstention Doctrine, supra note
35, at 109–11; RONALD E. SEAVOY, T HE ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN BUSINESS
CORPORATION, 1784–1855 7 (1982) (explaining the “five stages of corporation
creation” and how “rapid technological innovation and [market] expansion” incentivize
individuals to mobilize and take advantage of wealth opportunities).
53. See RAMSEYER, supra note 35, at 86, 135–36; Auerbach v. Bennett, 393 N.E.2d
994, 999–1000 (N.Y. 1979) (quoting Pollitz v. Wabash R.R. Co., 207 N.Y. 113, 124
(1912)).
54. 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985).
55. Nadelle Grossman, Director Compliance with Elusive Fiduciary Duties in a
Climate of Corporate Governance Reform, 12 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 393, 404
(2007) (stating that the duty of care has been reduced to an unenforceable aspiration).
56. See id. 404 n.49; see also Auerbach, 393 N.E.2d at 1000.
57. Bainbridge, Director Primacy, supra note 34, at 601 (“The business judgment
rule is the chief common law corollary to the separation of ownership and control.”).
58. Bainbridge, The Business Judgment Rule As Abstention Doctrine, supra note 35,
at 111.
59. See id. at 103 (explaining that a contractual responsibility to shareholders limits
the otherwise extensive discretionary powers of the directors to actions that will increase
the returns to shareholders).
60. Id. at 122–23.
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governance structure would: it compels directors to maximize shareholders’
interests.61
It is this very connection between limited liability and shareholder welfare
maximization that has provoked progressive calls for reform.62 For
progressive scholars, there is a great dissonance between conferring the
tremendous public benefit of limited liability upon enterprises
sociopathically focused on their own private interests.63 In progressive
scholars’ observations, this has been a formula for corporate anomie.64
Historicizing and contextualizing corporate governance doctrines is the
first step in evaluating them. For hardly any expertise in corporate law is
required to observe that there are many business corporations that are unlike
public companies; rather, these businesses’ investors are not nearly so
indifferent to the function of the entity as their public company counterparts
are.65 Even leaving aside business structures such as trade unions and worker
cooperatives, many business corporations are ones where shareholders are
invested in operations. In fact, most corporations doing business in the
United States are closely held business corporations66 — which substantially
overlap with, but are analytically distinct from, the private company, or one
whose shares are not traded on a public market.67 We are most familiar with
61. See Bainbridge, Director Primacy, supra note 34, at 601–02.
62. See id. at 593–94 (“Many progressives believe that corporate directors currently

do not take sufficient account of nonshareholder constituency interests and that legal
reform is necessary.”).
63. See Stephen M. Bainbridge, In Defense of the Shareholder Wealth Maximization
Norm: A Reply to Professor Green, 50 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1423, 1428 (1993)
[hereinafter Bainbridge, In Defense of the Shareholder Wealth Maximization Norm]
(describing one of Green’s arguments to which he replies as “envision[ing] the limited
liability rule as a privilege conferred by society, in return for which society can demand
socially responsible corporate behavior”).
64. See GREENFIELD, THE FAILURE OF CORPORATE LAW, supra note 33, at 17, 25–
26 (illustrating that many shareholders are generally unaware or disinterested in a
corporation’s machinations and instead are quite removed from the initial offering,
having “bought the stock from someone who bought the stock from someone who bought
the stock from someone who bought the stock from an investment banker who bought it
from the company”).
65. But see id. at 25 (discussing how shareholders are indifferent to companies in
which they own stock because of limited liability and diversified investment portfolios).
66. See DANA S HILLING & CHRISTINE VINCENT, LAWYER’S DESK B OOK § 1.09
(2d ed. 2020) (“Although most of the largest businesses are publicly owned (i.e., their
securities are freely traded on exchanges), most businesses are close corporations, whose
shares have no public market.”).
67. See GEVURTZ, supra note 34, at 231–32; PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS § 1.06 (AM. L. INST. 1994) (defining
a closely held corporation as a small number of people owning its equity securities for
which “no active trading market exists”).
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many “Mom and Pop” businesses run by owners who are often related and
for whom the appeal of ownership is having an active role in the business.68
To express this point from the angle of recent constitutional debate, much of
the discussion today about whether corporations enjoy “religious freedom”
is based, in part, on corporations’ claims that their business is more than a
commercial activity.69 Or these corporations at least insist that commercial
activity is also interested in how money is made or what is done to make it.70
And yet, with procrustean disregard for peculiarities and real differences,
all these business entities are governed by the same law of internal
governance. To engage with New York law on this question, it reflects this
same, sharp distinction between ownership and control,71 where default rules
provide that shareholders have a veto only in matters such as voting for
management, on fundamental changes,72 and in a corporation’s terminal
events such as whether to dissolve or merge with another entity.73 And for
68. See GEVURTZ, supra note 34, at 473 (explaining that “the extraordinarily
common practice of closely held corporations” is to disperse “their income to their
owners through salaries rather than dividends,” as owners “attribute the earnings of the
business to their work”).
69. See generally Amy J. Sepinwall, Corporate Piety and Impropriety: Hobby
Lobby’s Extension of RFRA Rights to the For-Profit Corporation, 5 HARV. BUS. L. REV.
173 (2015) (discussing RFRA defenses by corporate defendants).
70. See Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, 573 U.S. 682, 701 (2014) (discussing
business owners’ claims about how operation of their business is connected with
religious values). Matthew T. Bodie notes a similar reading of Burwell v. Hobby Lobby
by other scholars. See Matthew T. Bodie, The Next Iteration of Progressive Corporate
Law, 74 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 739, 762–63 (2017) (“Despite the result in eBay [Domestic
Holdings, Inc. v. Newmark], stakeholder theorists have not given up hope for doctrinal
victories . . . [due to] [t]he Court’s willingness to depart [in Burwell] from shareholder
primacy . . . .”); see also David K. Millon, Looking Back, Looking Forward: Personal
Reflections on a Scholarly Career, 74 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 699, 736–37 (2017)
[hereinafter Millon, Looking Back, Looking Forward] (articulating a similar
interpretation of Hobby Lobby); KENT GREENFIELD, CORPORATIONS ARE PEOPLE TOO:
(AND THEY SHOULD ACT LIKE IT) 98 (2018) (arguing that for-profit corporations can
have spiritual values too, but the law must be careful to ensure that such is not a pretext
for avoiding regulation).
71. See N.Y. BUS. CORP. LAW § 701 (McKinney 2021) (“Subject to any provision in
the certificate of incorporation authorized by paragraph (b) of section 620 (Agreements
as to voting; provision in certificate of incorporation as to control of directors) or
by paragraph (b) of section 715 (Officers), the business of a corporation shall be
managed under the direction of its board of directors, each of whom shall be at least
eighteen years of age. The certificate of incorporation or the by-laws may prescribe other
qualifications for directors.”).
72. See generally id. § 706 (regarding the removal of directors for cause, without
cause, under certain circumstances, and via court order).
73. See id. § 614(a) (vote on directors); id. § 803(a) (change of certificate of
incorporation subject to shareholder vote or approval except for certain minor matters);
id. § 903(a) (merger or consolidation authorized only by shareholder vote); id. § 1001(a)

92

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY BUSINESS LAW REVIEW

Vol. 10:1

all business corporations, corporate governance culminates with the same
BJR, which crystallizes the statutory recognition that boards call the shots in
corporations.74 True, the law acknowledges special circumstances, in closely
held corporations, that require the imposition of a “fairness” fiduciary duty
on directors and even majority shareholders.75 But even there, New York
law regards the BJR as protecting procedurally sound decisions: “fair
procedures,” it seems, is the sole limitation on directors’ conduct that
shareholders enjoy.76
How is this absolutism justified? The short answer is that New York
corporate law has applied public company reality to every type of business
corporation.77 This is presumably based on the historically recent belief that
the BJR and norm of shareholder maximization represent what all
shareholders would bargain for or what the democratic capitalist society
requires.78 Or perhaps the operative assumption is that all business
corporations are simply aspiring public companies.79 Whatever the
underlying reason, the law assumes that if a shareholder has a problem with
how a corporation is managed, then she can just sell her shares, including, in
the case of a private company, by inducing the corporation or majority
shareholders to buy her out.80 If the shares are too valuable to part with —
(shareholder vote on dissolution).
74. See Auerbach v. Bennett, 393 N.E.2d 994, 999–1000 (N.Y. 1979) (stating that
application of the BJR — which defers to directors’ good-faith business decisions — is
dispositive).
75. See GEVURTZ, supra note 34, at 345–51.
76. See Gallagher v. Lambert, 549 N.E.2d 136, 138 (N.Y. 1989) (holding that
minority shareholder has no claim for breach of fiduciary duty where he was terminated
before higher buy-back percentage vested as buy-back offer was “fair” to him, even if
below actual value of shares).
77. See infra notes 222–26 and accompanying text.
78. See EFFROSS , supra note 50, at 11–12; Stephen M. Bainbridge, Community and
Statism: A Conservative Contractarian Critique of Progressive Corporate Law
Scholarship, 82 CORNELL L. REV. 856, 903 (1997) [hereinafter Bainbridge, Community
and Statism] (contending that progressive corporate law, departure from mainstream law,
and economics views of the corporation “run counter to the spirit of a democratic
capitalist society”).
79. See SHILLING & VINCENT, supra note 66, § 1.09 (describing a “typical pattern”
as one where a company starts up and then goes public with an initial public offering,
before which stage a series of problems arises from its small and familial shareholder
composition); Benjamin C. Waterhouse, The Small Business Myth, AEON (Nov. 8, 2017),
https://aeon.co/essays/what-does-small-business-really-contribute-to-economic-growth
(arguing that in the 1980s, the Republican Party manipulated the mythology of small
businesses to abandon the vast majority that, remaining small, promote competition and
preserve local values in favor of elevating the few whose value is in “the[] potential to
cease to be small businesses”).
80. See N.Y. BUS. CORP. LAW §§ 1104-a, 1118 (McKinney 2021); In re Cristo Bros.,
Inc., 478 N.E.2d 176, 177 (N.Y. 1985) (holding that the judicially induced buyout
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say, the corporation owns some valuable, inalienable property or is party to
exclusive contracts — then the law suggests that the shareholder vote out the
directors by persuading her peers to appoint a new board.81 Or, the law
insists, the shareholder can just buy a controlling stake and then appoint
directors who will do her bidding.82 Regardless of the law’s solution, the
supposition remains the same: the value of stock in a corporation always
can be monetized and liquidated. This means that the law never supposes an
investor to be irreparably harmed, in a nonmonetary fashion, by board
irresponsibility, even where participation in a corporation is her chief source
of income. The remedy always remains the monetary one of dissolution and
liquidation.83 The question remains whether this exclusively monetary view
of corporations’ value is an accurate description of reality.
III. CRITIQUING THE NEOLIBERAL GOVERNANCE PARADIGM
A. The Progressive Corporate Law Critique and Reform Program
Criticism of neoliberal corporate governance has not been limited to its
incompatibility with “Mom and Pop” businesses. Rather, the criticism has
most vigorously and roundly been applied to public companies, the very
context in which neoliberal corporate governance was developed. The
critique of public company corporate governance law has generally been
labelled progressive corporate law, but has also been referred to as
“communitarianism,” the “multi-fiduciary model,” or the “stakeholder
theory.”84
This critique has been carried out by many participants, but its main ideas
are contained in articles by six scholars85 and two books: a 1995 collection
procedure under section 1118 of New York’s Business Corporation Law applies to
holders of fifty percent of shares of a closely held corporation).
81. See S. & S. Realty Corp. v. Kleer-Vu Indus., Inc., 384 N.Y.S.2d 796, 797 (App.
Div. 1976) (upholding shareholder’s petition for access to shareholder list to distribute
materials to fellow shareholders urging them not to re-elect board).
82. See Crane Co. v. Anaconda Co., 346 N.E.2d 507, 514 (N.Y. 1976) (upholding
shareholder’s right to access list of shareholders in connection with offer to purchase
stock).
83. Compare In re Kemp & Beatley, Inc., 473 N.E.2d 1173, 1176 (N.Y. 1984)
(upholding lower court dissolution of corporation because majority shareholders refused
to issue dividends to minority shareholder), with Ingle v. Glamore Motor Sales, Inc., 535
N.E.2d 1311, 1313 (N.Y. 1989) (upholding dismissal of action for damages, holding that
minority shareholder in a close corporation is not insulated from being fired at will).
84. Bodie, supra note 70, at 748.
85. I focus on these six scholars because, as of June 13, 2020, a Westlaw search for
“progressive corporate law” produces 527 law review articles. Each of the twenty most
cited articles under the search term “progressive corporate law” analyzes or references
writings by these six scholars. Ultimately, I acknowledge a point that one of the listed
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of essays contained in an anthology entitled Progressive Corporate Law,86
edited by Lawrence Mitchell, and Kent Greenfield’s 2010 work, The Failure
of Corporate Law.87 The articles, whose basic points are summarized in this
Section, are by Lynne Dallas,88 Kent Greenfield,89 Lyman Johnson,90 David

scholars concedes: that the exercise of constituting a list is admittedly “idiosyncratic.”
See David Millon, Communitarians, Contractarians, and the Crisis in Corporate Law,
50 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1373, 1391 n.47 (1993) [hereinafter Millon, Communitarians]
(citing other participants in the communitarian critique and reform movement).
86. PROGRESSIVE CORPORATE LAW (Lawrence E. Mitchell ed., 1995).
87. See GREENFIELD, THE FAILURE OF CORPORATE LAW, supra note 33.
88. Lynne L. Dallas, Two Models of Corporate Governance: Beyond Berle and
Means, 22 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 19 (1988) [hereinafter Dallas, Two Models of
Corporate Governance]; Lynne L. Dallas, Proposals for Reform of Corporate Boards of
Directors: The Dual Board and Board Ombudsperson, 54 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 91
(1997) [hereinafter Dallas, Proposals for Reform of Corporate Boards of Directors];
Lynne L. Dallas, Law and Socioeconomics in Legal Education, 55 RUTGERS L. REV. 855
(2003) [hereinafter Dallas, Law and Socioeconomics in Legal Education].
89. Prior to publishing his 2010 book, Kent Greenfield had described its main points
across nearly twenty years of scholarship. See Kent Greenfield & John E. Nilsson,
Gradgrind’s Education: Using Dickens and Aristotle to Understand (and Replace?) the
Business Judgment Rule, 63 BROOK. L. REV. 799 (1997); Kent Greenfield, The Place of
Workers in Corporate Law, 39 B.C. L. REV. 283 (1998); Kent Greenfield, There’s a
Forest in Those Trees: Teaching About the Role of Corporations in Society, 34 GA. L.
REV. 1011 (2000); Kent Greenfield, Using Behavioral Economics to Show the Power
and Efficiency of Corporate Law as Regulatory Tool, 35 U.C. DAVIS. L. REV. 581 (2002);
Kent Greenfield & Peter C. Kostant, An Experimental Test of Fairness Under Agency
and Profit-Maximization Constraints (With Notes on Implications for Corporate
Governance), 71 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 983 (2003); Kent Greenfield, Proposition: Saving
the World with Corporate Law, 57 EMORY L.J. 948 (2008); Kent Greenfield, Reclaiming
Corporate Law in a New Gilded Age, 2 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 1 (2008); Kent
Greenfield, The Third Way, 37 Seattle U. L. Rev. 749 (2014).
90. Lyman P.Q. Johnson, The Social Responsibility of Corporate Law Professors,
76 TUL. L. REV. 1483 (2002) [hereinafter Johnson, The Social Responsibility of
Corporate Law Professors]; Lyman P.Q. Johnson & David Millon, Recalling Why
Corporate Officers Are Fiduciaries, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1597 (2005) [hereinafter
Johnson & Millon, Recalling Why Corporate Officers Are Fiduciaries]; Lyman P.Q.
Johnson, Faith and Faithfulness in Corporate Theory, 56 CATH. U. L. REV. 1 (2006)
[hereinafter Johnson, Faith and Faithfulness in Corporate Theory]; Johnson, ReEnchanting the Corporation, supra note 16.
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Millon,91 Lawrence Mitchell,92 and Lynn Stout.93 The two books, also
summarized below, have bookended progressive corporate law scholarship,
though articles have been published since. For example, Matthew Bodie’s
2017 article, as part of a symposium celebrating the scholarship of Lyman
Johnson and David Millon, speaks of the Next Iteration of Progressive
Corporate Law.94
Stephen Bainbridge has described the Progressive Corporate Law
(“PCL”) volume as a useful introduction to scholarship opposing law and
economics movement in public company corporate law.95 Published fifteen
years after PCL, Greenfield’s book stands out as the foremost progressive
critique since, in his description, it is the only work expressly challenging
the neoliberal, contractarian perspective on corporations informing the
current state of law96 and proposing concrete reforms advancing the common
good.97 But all progressive scholars, writing before and after Greenfield’s
book, put forward similar criticisms of neoliberal governance. Despite their
main critic’s claim that progressive corporate law scholars “are far more
firmly united by what they oppose — Chicago-style law and economics —
91. See Millon, Communitarians, supra note 85; David Millon, Redefining
Corporate Law, 24 IND. L. REV. 223 (1991) [hereinafter Millon, Redefining Corporate
Law]; David Millon, Default Rules, Wealth Distribution, and Corporate Law Reform:
Employment at Will Versus Job Security, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 975 (1998) [hereinafter
Millon, Default Rules]; David Millon, New Game Plan or Business As Usual? A Critique
of the Team Production Model of Corporate Law, 86 VA. L. REV. 1001 (2000)
[hereinafter Millon, New Game Plan or Business As Usual?]; David Millon, Radical
Shareholder Primacy, 10 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 1013 (2013); David Millon, Shareholder
Social Responsibility, 36 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 911 (2013) [hereinafter Millon,
Shareholder Social Responsibility]; Millon, Looking Back, Looking Forward, supra note
70.
92. Lawrence E. Mitchell, The Human Corporation: Some Thoughts on Hume,
Smith, and Buffett, 19 CARDOZO L. REV. 341 (1997) [hereinafter Mitchell, The Human
Corporation]; Lawrence E. Mitchell, Trust and Team Production in Post-Capitalist
Society, 24 J. CORP. L. 869 (1999) [hereinafter Mitchell, Trust and Team Production in
Post-Capitalist Society]; Lawrence E. Mitchell, The Importance of Being Trusted, 81
B.U. L. REV. 591 (2001) [hereinafter Mitchell, The Importance of Being Trusted].
93. Lynn A. Stout, The Unimportance of Being Efficient: An Economic Analysis of
Stock Market Pricing and Securities Regulation, 87 MICH. L. REV. 613 (1988); Margaret
M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production Theory of Corporate Law, 85 VA. L.
REV. 247 (1999) [hereinafter Blair & Stout, A Team Production Theory of Corporate
Law]; Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, Trust, Trustworthiness, and the Behavioral
Foundations of Corporate Law, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1735 (2001) [hereinafter Blair &
Stout, Trust, Trustworthiness, and the Behavioral Foundations of Corporate Law]; Stout,
Why We Should Stop Teaching Dodge v. Ford, supra note 18.
94. Bodie, supra note 70.
95. See Bainbridge, Community and Statism, supra note 78, at 857.
96. See GREENFIELD, THE FAILURE OF CORPORATE LAW, supra note 33, at 3–5.
97. See id. at 5.
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than by what they support”98 — their various criticisms cohere into three
main points.
First, progressive scholars contend that modern corporate law has ignored
the public function of public companies.99 Specifically, they posit that
corporate law mistakes public companies for private bodies whose activities
serve the common good, if at all, simply by operation of the invisible hand
and trickling down.100 Greenfield observes this by framing his book as a gap
filler for neoliberal, contractarian analysis.101 Later on, Greenfield
articulates a guiding principle for law: public companies should be measured
by whether the value they create is greater than the cost they impose on
society on the whole.102 Similarly, in introducing PCL, Lawrence Mitchell
states that, in view to all the harms corporations visit upon society, “[o]ur
historical treatment of the corporation as a public good in the private service
can no longer be sustained . . . . It is time that the corporation be recognized
as what it is: a public institution with public obligations.”103
Second, progressive scholars contend that, as public institutions, public
companies must be made to serve the interests of all those with ties to
them.104 All includes direct stakeholders such as workers, but also indirect
one such as the public at large, who are injured by the externalities of
corporations’ activities.105 Progressive scholars are also united in asserting
that corporate law should recognize and protect the nonmonetary and
humanistic benefits that public companies confer upon other stakeholders,
primarily employees. In an essay within PCL entitled Communitarianism in
Corporate Law: Foundations and Law Reform Strategies,106 David Millon
describes the “challenge[] to corporate law’s traditional commitment to the
shareholder primary principle” as the “communitarian approach,” where the
focus is on the “sociological and moral phenomenon of the corporation as
98. Bainbridge, Community and Statism, supra note 78, at 857.
99. See GREENFIELD, THE FAILURE OF CORPORATE LAW, supra note 33, at 1–2.
100. See id. at 2 (discussing the harms and flaws in American corporate law as a result

of the way corporations are organized).
101. See id. at 4–5.
102. See id. at 128.
103. See Lawrence E. Mitchell, Preface to PROGRESSIVE CORPORATE LAW xiii
(Lawrence E. Mitchell ed., 1995) [hereinafter Mitchell, Preface].
104. See David Millon, Communitarianism in Corporate Law: Foundations and Law
Reform Strategies, in PROGRESSIVE CORPORATE LAW 5 (Lawrence E. Mitchell ed., 1995)
[hereinafter Millon, Communitarianism in Corporate Law].
105. See id. (noting that, for example, when a plant closes, communitarians consider
not only the employees who will lose their jobs, but also the consumers who may lose
access to the product and the community that may lose tax revenues).
106. Millon, Communitarianism in Corporate Law, supra note 104.
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community, in contrast to the individualistic, self-reliant, contractarian
stance that dominates current academic discourse in corporate law.”107
Millon regards this communitarian turn in public company corporate law as
being inspired by “concern about the harm to nonshareholders that can occur
as a result of managerial adherence to the shareholder primacy principle.”108
In a more recent article, Millon makes the same point negatively by arguing
that the modern, mainstream corporate governance view of shareholder
welfare maximization, based on self-interest, is simply incompatible with a
public company exercising any social responsibility to anyone.109 Returning
to PCL, Lewis D. Solomon closes the book with an essay entitled On the
Frontier of Capitalism: Implementation of Humanomics by Modern Publicly
Held Corporations — A Critical Assessment,110 where he favorably
examines two corporations — one formed in the United States and the other
in England — that have implemented a humanonics approach to business
operations.111 Solomon frames the humanonics approach as one that can
create “business organizations that will promote both human growth and
ecological considerations as part of a larger interest in the quality of life and
the preservation of the planet.”112
Third, all progressive scholars reject the contractarian reduction of public
company corporate law, or the contention that such corporations are not
societies in and of themselves governed by social mores, but rather are mere
“nexus[es] of contracts.”113 These progressives reject contractarianism
because it obscures the degree to which all contracts are subject to precontractual entitlement rules that are not themselves products of the market
but rather are informed by socio-cultural considerations.114 For example,
107. Id. at 1.
108. Id.
109. Millon, Shareholder Social Responsibility, supra note 91, at 911, 928–29

(arguing that short-termism, the current practice arising out of the shareholder welfare
maximization norm, is incompatible with corporate social responsibility).
110. Lewis D. Solomon, On the Frontier of Capitalism: The Implementation of
Humanomics by Modern Publicly Held Corporations: A Critical Assessment, 50 WASH.
& LEE L. REV. 1625, 1642–43 (1993), reprinted in PROGRESSIVE CORPORATE LAW 281
(Lawrence E. Mitchell ed., 1995)
111. See generally id. (analyzing Ben & Jerry’s, the American one, and The Body
Shop International PLC, the English one).
112. Id. at 282.
113. See, e.g., GREENFIELD, THE FAILURE OF CORPORATE LAW, supra note 33, at 149
(stating that under the “nexus of contracts” view of a firm, important market participants
should be put in decision-making positions as this is the best way to make fair decisions).
114. See Mitchell, Preface, supra note 103, at xiii–xv (stating that the “dominant trend
in corporate law scholarship” that treats corporations like private contractual
arrangements is “doomed to fail” because it does not consider human behavior and is
detached from reality).
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Millon criticizes what he classifies as progressive contractarian arguments
on the very basis that they elide how property rights are the product of
societal policy decisions.115 Likewise, Lynne Dallas’ essay in the same
volume, Working Toward a New Paradigm,116 expresses deep skepticism of
the shareholder primacy norm as “economically natural,” remarking that it
is the product of policymaking.117 Dallas also follows Millon in arguing that
contractarianism is normatively suspect because it ignores other, precontractual considerations such as the public function of work for
employees, disregarding other stakeholders’ investment of labor, an asset.118
In another PCL essay, Some Observations Writing the Legal History of the
Corporation in the Age of Theory,119 Gregory A. Marks reinforces this
critique through tracing the historiography of corporate law, showing that
neoliberal theory has overtaken history to recast the origins of corporations
as the natural result of market economics, instead of as the product of policymaking.120 Finally, although Greenfield notes that his proposal ironically
stands as “the genuine realization of the ‘nexus of contracts’ view of the
firm,”121 he rejects contractarian atomization of the corporation in that he
advocates for the robust participation of other stakeholders in governance by
having a seat on the board as a matter of course.122 This reflects a social,
rather than contractual, view of entities.
As part of criticizing this reduction, progressive corporate scholars also
reject the contractarian, self-interest rationality undergirding neoliberal
governance for a more social and relational understanding of human
beings.123 Solomon’s essay on humanonics discussed above points to this,124
though other progressive scholars are more explicit. They all agree on a
more social and communitarian view of economic rationality, but their
precise conceptions span a range whose poles are a harder institutional
115. See Millon, Communitarianism in Corporate Law, supra note 104, at 24–25.
116. Lynne L. Dallas, Working Toward a New Paradigm, in PROGRESSIVE

CORPORATE LAW (Lawrence E. Mitchell ed., 1995).
117. See id. at 39.
118. See id. at 49–50.
119. Gregory A. Mark, Some Observations on Writing the Legal History of the
Corporation in the Age of Theory, in PROGRESSIVE CORPORATE LAW (Lawrence E.
Mitchell ed., 1995).
120. See id. at 85.
121. GREENFIELD, THE FAILURE OF CORPORATE LAW, supra note 33, at 149.
122. See id. at 149–50.
123. See Blair & Stout, Trust, Trustworthiness, and the Behavioral Foundations of
Corporate Law, supra note 93, at 1737 (arguing that self-interested contractarian
rationality cannot fully account for how corporate constituents cooperate amongst each
other).
124. See supra notes 110–12 and accompanying text.
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understanding and a softer cultural one. At the harder end is Dallas’ power
vision of public companies, where a corporation is thought of as a more
formal institution, but one molded by historical, cultural, and political forces,
rather than standing as an economically efficient firm.125 Almost twenty
years later, Dallas stood by her basic viewpoint, describing this perspective
as law and socioeconomics (“LSOC”).126 As Dallas describes it, LSOC
understands all economic participants, and not just corporate ones, to be
consumers within the context of the legal/institutional environment, social
rules, and market power, not just economically efficient structures.127 At the
center is Stout and Blair’s team production model, which regards public
companies as webs of personal relationships mediated by the board,128 sort
of like electrons circulating a nucleus. In an article two years after their team
production one, Stout and Blair elaborated the interstitial fulcrum of the
team, or the matrix in which the electrons and nucleus exist: the central
concept of trust.129 This concept both brings us back to the center and segues
to the opposite pole. Looking backwards, Mitchell draws upon Blair and
Stout’s observation and argues that trust renders the corporation a social
institution, and much less an arms-length nexus of self-interested actors.130
Moving forward, Mitchell and Johnson both argue that the operative
necessity of trust emphasizes the humanity of corporations, a quality that
allows for a pluralistic view of corporations as also being governed by social
values, including religion, instead of rational self-interest.131 In a later
article, Johnson and Mitchell join Blair and Stout132 in arguing that the
personal, social notion of trust also better explains certain elements of
corporate law doctrine such as the fiduciary duties of loyalty and care,133
125. Dallas, Two Models of Corporate Governance, supra note 88, at 25–27.
126. See Dallas, Law and Socioeconomics in Legal Education, supra note 88, at 855–

56, 858–59.
127. Id.
128. See Blair & Stout, A Team Production Theory of Corporate law, supra note 93,
at 253–54 (arguing that boards exist to protect enterprise-specific investments of all
members of the team).
129. See Blair & Stout, Trust, Trustworthiness, and the Behavioral Foundations,
supra note 93, at 1737–38.
130. Mitchell, Trust and Team Production in Post-Capitalist Society, supra note 92,
at 870–72.
131. See Mitchell, The Human Corporation, supra note 92, at 358–61; Johnson, Faith
and Faithfulness in Corporate Theory, supra note 90, at 6; Johnson, Re-Enchanting the
Corporation, supra note 16, at 98–99 (positing that many business actors are motivated
more by “sympathy towards others” than profit maximization).
132. See Mitchell, Trust and Team Production in Post-Capitalist Society, supra note
92, at 871; Johnson, Faith and Faithfulness in Corporate Theory, supra note 90, at 6.
133. See Johnson, The Social Responsibility of Corporate Law Professors, supra note
90, at 1499–1500 (arguing that law professors have a duty to teach fiduciary duties in a
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which we considered above in Part II.
Building from these three points, progressive scholars propose the same
communitarian changes to corporate governance. In his book, Greenfield
refers to “three proposals most often put forward by progressive corporate
law scholars . . . : relaxation of the profit norm, including workers within the
directors’ fiduciary duties, and placing workers’ representatives on the
boards of directors,” based on European models.134 He describes these as so
common among progressives that he need not even discuss their
rationales.135 Millon, though uncertain of the concrete details of a
communitarian turn, aligns with Greenfield in proposing reforms meant to
bring social benefit into corporate law by authorizing directors to consider
other stakeholders’ interests.136 In a later article, Greenfield becomes a bit
more concrete and proposes what he characterizes as a “modest reform”:
enacting a statute changing default rules whereby employee stakeholder
interests would be assumed.137 By this, they would not be left to protect
themselves through private bargaining, an inadequate path given clear wealth
and power disparities.138 Continuing along this path of statutory reforms,
Millon and Johnson argue that to build cultures of morality, corporate law
should adopt the more rigorous agency-law fiduciary standard for corporate
managers, and not the lesser standard corporate law applies to directors.139
For Dallas, the key reform is a variant on the sort Greenfield describes: a
requirement that public companies have two boards, each led by an
independent ombudsperson serving outsiders.140 Through this reform,
corporations can monitor for conflicts (the task of one board), but also
advance the relationships with corporations consistent with her power theory
(the task for the other).141
It is important to observe from this summary what the progressive
corporate critique affirms of public companies. It recognizes them as valid
broad, moral, and social sense); Johnson, Re-Enchanting the Corporation, supra note 16,
at 98–99; Mitchell, The Importance of Being Trusted, supra note 92, at 614–15.
134. See GREENFIELD, THE FAILURE OF CORPORATE LAW, supra note 33, at 124.
135. See id.
136. See Millon, Communitarianism in Corporate Law, supra note 104, at 13, 30–31
(describing the communitarian turn as reforming the entitlement structure underlying
corporate law).
137. See Millon, Default Rules, supra note 91, at 979, 995.
138. See id. at 979.
139. Johnson & Millon, Recalling Why Corporate Officers Are Fiduciaries, supra
note 90, at 1601.
140. Dallas, Proposals for Reform of Corporate Boards of Directors, supra note 88,
at 130–32.
141. Id. at 132–34.
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and useful in and of themselves, avoiding the notion that they should be
abolished in the name of public good. Indeed, Greenfield goes the furthest
on this point and identifies four specific characteristics of business
corporations — “[the] easy transferability of shares, limited liability,
specialized and centralized management, and a perpetual existence separate
from their shareholders” — as features that render them “especially able to
create financial prosperity.”142 Millon recognizes how public companies, in
providing “adequate compensation, healthful and pleasant working
conditions, some amount of control over work, and job security are necessary
for the achievement of self-realization in the workplace.”143 Millon’s
problem is that the “current market conditions may render these goods
unattainable for many employees.”144
From this, we should appreciate that the progressive project has simply
sought to ensure that public companies’ social function is not undermined by
the market; they identify the source of corporate anomie as the norm of
shareholder welfare maximization, not the structure itself. Accordingly, they
propose changes to corporate law that amount to advancing a “thicker”
conception of the public company as a community of all constituents formed
for the benefit of larger society, instead of as a loose nexus of self-interested
profiteers. They argue that this thickening can happen by broadening the
scope of interests that corporate directors must take into account.
B. The Failure of Progressive Corporate Law to
Reform Public Company Governance
To date, this “thicker” communitarian conception of a public company has
failed to displace corporate law’s looser, contractual conception
apotheosizing profit.145 The question remains why it has failed. I submit
that this is because progressive proposals have been too theoretical, modest,
or subtle to take. For example, take the reform of weakening the
maximization norm and mandating stakeholder representation on the board,
principally workers. It is based on the landscape in Germany,146 which
serves to suggest that it is feasible. But relying on a German example raises
the question of whether it can be implemented in the United States’ different
142.
143.
144.
145.

GREENFIELD, THE FAILURE OF CORPORATE LAW, supra note 33, at 131.
See Millon, Communitarianism in Corporate Law, supra note 104, at 9.
Id.
See Bodie, supra note 70, at 740 (explaining that progressive corporate law is
moving away from shareholder wealth maximization towards a “communitarian vision
of the corporation,” yet progressive theory must continue to evolve in order to be a
formidable alternative).
146. See GREENFIED , THE FAILURE OF CORPORATE LAW, supra note 33, at 42, 150.
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socio-legal culture. When shifting to other proposals, the problem becomes
that they appear as mere tweaks to the standard model:147 for example, the
proposals calling for the application of agency-law fiduciary standard,148 a
shift of contract rules default rules,149or conception of omnipotent boards of
directors as relational mediators.150
One reason why progressives seem to tread lightly is because of what they
affirm about public companies: they propose reform in the name of classical
capitalism as found in Adam Smith’s The Wealth of Nations.151 As discussed
above, the whole point of the progressive critique is for public companies to
serve as the greatest vehicle for wealth creation in human history for all, not
just a miniscule elite.152 As such, the critique seems to presuppose that
business corporations serve ends defined as market capitalism, instead of
standing as a counter to the ruthlessness of markets. For this reason, their
proposals focus on public companies, and largely leave intact the basic
structure of neoliberal governance corporate law discussed above in Part
II.153
At the root of the progressive critique’s inefficacy is its description of the
problem as “shareholder primacy.” On closer inspection of progressives’
arguments, they posit the problem as the law’s requirement that managers
care only about shareholders’ monetary interests, to the detriment of any
nonmonetary interest for anyone.154 This is what shareholder primacy
actually means, regardless of whether one technically adheres to a neoliberal
governance theory giving directors, as opposed to shareholders, corporate
primacy.155 But as we saw from the discussion above in Part II, New York
147. Bodie, supra note 70, at 750–51.
148. See Johnson & Millon, Recalling Why Corporate Officers Are Fiduciaries, supra

note 90, at 1601 (discussing their proposed reform).
149. See Millon, Default Rules, supra note 91, at 979, 995 (discussing his proposed
reform).
150. See Dallas, Proposals for Reform of Corporate Boards of Directors, supra note
88, at 130–32 (discussing the conceptualization of boards).
151. See ADAM SMITH, AN I NQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE
WEALTH OF N ATIONS: COMPLETE AND UNABRIDGED 421–22 (Edwin Cannan ed.,
1904) (1776) (discussing the “classicus locus” of the invisible hand concept).
152. See GREENFIELD, THE FAILURE OF CORPORATE LAW, supra note 33, at 132.
153. See Bodie, supra note 70, at 750–51; see also Millon, New Game Plan or
Business As Usual?, supra note 91, at 1003–05 (arguing that the Stout and Blair team
production model perpetuates the status quo regarding a board of directors as a mediating
hierarch within a relationship conception of corporations but does not propose anything
serving to insulate boards from political pressure undermining communitarianism).
154. See, e.g., Millon, Communitarianism in Corporate Law, supra note 104, at 5–6.
155. See Bainbridge, Director Primacy, supra note 34, at 563, 574 (“[D]irector
primacy does not discard the concept of shareholder wealth maximalization as a
bargained for right of the shareholders.”).
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corporate law and corporate law generally, do not really protect or care about
anyone’s nonmonetary interests, even if those folks are shareholders.156 And
so, the problem of neoliberal corporate law is not so much shareholder
primacy, but rather the absolutization of profit, for which the idea of
shareholder primacy stands as a proxy.157
However, because progressive scholars have expressed their criticisms in
terms of shareholder primacy, they have set their critique up for rejection.
This is because, wholly assuming that corporations, and especially public
companies, are uniquely suited to generate wealth — a point that
progressives seemingly concede in, for example, Greenfield’s observation of
their special attributes158 — weakening shareholders’ legal primacy threatens
to undermine corporations’ ability to do what they are best suited for.
Eminent corporate scholar Bainbridge has formulated the entire case against
progressive public company law by reinforcing this risk with two points.
First, Bainbridge has suggested that the current law, especially its norm of
shareholder wealth maximization, reflects what economically rational
investors would bargain for anyway.159 That is why the shareholder norm
governs even when, as Bainbridge holds, directors technically enjoy primacy
in corporations.160 Second, he has contended that the wealth maximization
norm reflects human nature and the quiddity of the U.S. democratic capitalist
system.161 If Europeans allow for another norm to govern, that is because
156. See supra notes 78–83 and accompanying text.
157. See G REENFIELD, THE FAILURE OF CORPORATE LAW, supra note 33, at 218, 224–

26; EFFROSS, supra note 50, § 1.07(C) (citing LAWRENCE E. MITCHELL, CORPORATE
IRRESPONSIBILITY: AMERICA’S NEWEST EXPORT 4–5 (2001)) (“Unlike advocates of
shareholder primacy, communitarians have attacked the maximalization of shareholder
wealth as ‘an imperative that is as destructive as it is simple’ because it emphasizes shortterm financial gains over long-term social welfare.”).
158. See Johnson & Millon, Recalling Why Corporate Officers Are Fiduciaries, supra
note 90, at 1630 (citing Greenfield’s research on officers’ “duty to maximize
stockholder wealth”).
159. See EFFROSS , supra note 50, § 1.05 (citing STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, THE N EW
CORPORATE G OVERNANCE IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 65–66 (2008)); see also
MICHAEL R. D IAMOND, CORPORATIONS: A CONTEMPORARY APPROACH 23–26 (5th
ed. 2019) (citing ALLAN A. KENNEDY, THE END OF SHAREHOLDER VALUE:
CORPORATIONS AT THE CROSSROADS (2001)) (discussing shareholder valuism, on the
obsession over stock price arising out of the high tech boom, in the context of Allan
Kennedy’s thesis in The End of Shareholder Value: Corporations at the Crossroads
that “the contemporary obsession on stock prices has created the idea that the sole
purpose for the existence of business is to make money . . . driving managers to focus on
stock prices in the short-term, with adverse consequences for long-term business
health . . .”).
160. See Bainbridge, The Business Judgment Rule As Abstention Doctrine, supra note
35, at 110–11, 123.
161. See Bainbridge, Community and Statism, supra note 78, at 903.
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their society is different: they might be statists.162
The upshot of Bainbridge’s argument is that shareholder wealth
maximization may be a fifth feature — to add to Greenfield’s four mentioned
above163 — explaining why corporations have a genius for attracting capital.
Even worse for the progressive project, it too would be a cultural principle,
standing as a normative account of how all corporations should be organized
in our “free society.”164 If it is true that the feature of shareholder welfare
maximization is why corporations are so effective in attracting investment,
it follows that displacing the maximization norm risks ruining corporations’
very social utility. On the basis of progressives’ theoretical and subtle
arguments so far, why should policymakers take any chances, especially
where even progressives agree with the social benefit of corporate wealthgeneration?165
The progressive argument has suffered from want of a concrete, American
example of an effective communitarian business corporation. Absent this
example, the progressive case cannot seize the argument. Rather, its
proposals are received as ideals corporate managers are free to adopt and test
out in a market and judges are free to disregard. But such an approach
produces no change. This is a danger Millon recognized twenty-five years
ago.166 His observation remains. As a result, progressive proposals for
public company reform have failed to cure corporate law’s disregard of
communitarian rationality.167 Having failed to question whether the purpose
of a business corporation is profit, but rather only having raised some
concern about profits for whose benefit, it has reinforced the validity of
neoliberal governance.

162. Id.
163. See supra note 142 and accompanying text.
164. See Bainbridge, Community and Statism, supra note 78, at 890–900 (arguing that

the progressive corporate law project is statist and, thereby, incompatible with American
culture’s ideal of free, voluntary trust and community). This, of course, also is Milton
Friedman’s argument in his famous 1970 article: that social responsibility should arise
out of the free choice of charity, not the normative compulsion of corporate social
responsibility. See Milton Friedman, A Friedman Doctrine — The Social Responsibility
of Business Is to Increase Its Profits, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 13, 1970) [hereinafter Friedman,
A Friedman Doctrine], https://www.nytimes.com/1970/09/13/archives/a-friedmandoctrine-the-social-responsibility-of-business-is-to.html.
165. See GREENFIELD, THE FAILURE OF CORPORATE LAW, supra note 33, at 131–32.
166. See Millon, Communitarianism in Corporate Law, supra note 104, at 13.
167. See Bodie, supra note 70, at 740 (discussing the shortcomings of progressive
theory despite its successes).
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IV. ADVANCING THE CRITIQUE: THE HDFC AS A
BUSINESS CORPORATION COUNTERING MARKETS
A. Unlocking Function: The Key of the Black and Brown HDFC
As we saw in Section III.B, the progressive critique of public company
governance leaves us to imagine that all corporations serve a monetary
function. For it invites us to question to whom corporate profit should go,
but it does not question whether the point of a corporation is profit. The
HDFC comes in to pick up where progressive corporate law leaves off,
providing a different answer. For like the public company, the HDFC is
incorporated as a business corporation; New York’s business corporation
law, and the whole standard corporate drama involving derivative suits and
shareholder inspection and proxy contests, fully apply to it.168 And the
HDFC operates its business in a competitive and cutthroat market: New
York City’s hypercommodified real estate market.169 But serving as a
vehicle for stability countering the real estate market,170 it rejects the public
company’s understanding of corporate function and posits that at least some
business corporations exist for reasons other than profit.
A closer examination of the HDFC allows this duality to become clearer.
In an HDFC, tenants invest to own shares in a corporation owning and
operating a residential apartment building as housing for low-income
individuals.171 Even though HDFCs, when formed as business corporations,
are still subject to the “non-distribution constraint” typical of nonprofits,172
168. See N.Y. PRIV. H OUS . FIN. LAW § 573(1) (McKinney 2021); Valyrakis v. 346
W. 48th St. Hous. Dev. Fund Corp., 76 N.Y.S.3d 523, 527 (App. Div. 2018) (determining
shareholder tenant’s complaints under the derivative litigation demand standard and
business judgment rule); Santiesteban v. 94–102 Hamilton Place H.D.F.C., No.
11736/09, 2009 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 6446, at *13–14 (Sup. Ct. Nov. 18, 2009) (granting
HDFC shareholder right to access records under business corporation law and common
law).
169. See sources cited supra note 29.
170. See Greg Olear, A Look at HDFCs: Understanding Housing Development Fund
Corporation Co-Ops, N.Y. COOPERATOR, (Sept. 2017), https://cooperator.com/article/alook-at-hdfcs/full (“‘One of the things that is beautiful about HDFC co-ops is that the
people who lived in the distressed, neglected, and abandoned buildings in the
neighborhoods in the ‘70s and ‘80s where these HDFCs were first created are still there
now,’ says Rachel Christmas Derrick, director of communications and fundraising for
[Urban Housing Assistance Board]. ‘Though sadly, many of their neighbors in rentals
are being displaced by gentrification. So that many of these people — particularly in
Harlem and Brooklyn neighborhoods — are still the primarily black and Latino residents
who lived there in the beginning. And they can now enjoy the positive aspects of the
neighborhoods that they fought so long and hard to improve.’”).
171. See N.Y. PRIV. HOUS. FIN. LAW §§ 571, 573.
172. See id. § 573(3) (“3. The certificate of incorporation of any such corporation
shall, in addition to any other requirements of law, provide: . . . b. that all income and

106

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY BUSINESS LAW REVIEW

Vol. 10:1

their shareholders benefit from owning shares worth hundreds of thousands
of dollars in gentrifying real estate markets.173 HDFCs also offer standard
tax-law benefits such as mortgage interest deduction.174 And since HDFCs
have to pay New York City property taxes, albeit reduced ones — one reason
why HDFCs came to own buildings was that the government could generate
tax revenue175 — shareholders often benefit from an effectively run, solvent
business. This is especially the case in New York City, where building
owners behind on property taxes face divestment under a Third Party
Transfer Program (“TPT”) discussed further below.176
But there is a different rationality at operation. At the level of investment,
we can observe another type of logic. Buying into a housing cooperative is
a business decision — it is a tenant’s perennial interest to obtain the most
affordable, stable, and secure housing.177 But buying into a housing
earnings of the corporation shall be used exclusively for corporate purposes, and that no
part of the net income or net earnings of the corporation shall inure to the benefit or
profit of any private individual, firm, corporation or association.”); James J. Fishman,
The Development of Nonprofit Corporation Law and An Agenda for Reform, 34 EMORY
L.J. 617, 663 (1985) (noting the “non-distribution constraint” in the HDFC statute).
173. See Emily Nonko, New York City’s Affordable HDFC Co-Op Explained,
CURBED N.Y. (Mar. 25, 2020, 8:56 AM), https://ny.curbed.com/2020/3/25/21192807/hd
fc-new-york-income-based-housing (“[O]riginally, the apartments were sold to residents
for a mere $250. For years the units were resold for moderate amounts, but the past
decade or so has brought super-gentrification to some of the neighborhoods in which
HDFCs are plentiful. Resale listings have popped up for as much as $1 million (though
that high of an asking price is rare), and buyers have increasingly made all-cash offers.
As a result, prices have trended up for HDFC coop housing in recent years and made
many out of reach for low-income New Yorkers . . . . The modern-day HDFC buyer
tends to be one with a lower income but significant assets: retirees, young buyers with
financial assistance from parents, and those with trust funds or an inheritance.”);
Memorandum from Geoffrey Propheter, N.Y. Indep. Budget Off., on Cost Estimates for
Alternative Tax Exemptions for Some HDFC Coops to George Sweeting, N.Y. Indep.
Budget Off., 8–9 (Dec. 3, 2015), https://ibo.nyc.ny.us/iboreports/estimating-cost-of-fulltax-exemption-for-hdfc-coop-buildings.pdf (stating that New York City-wide median
sales price for HDFC cooperative units from 2010 through 2015 had been $270,200, with
median prices in strong markets such as mid-and-lower Manhattan and downtown
Brooklyn and Williamsburg/Greenpoint being $360,000); Michelle Higgins, Bargains
With a “But,” N.Y. TIMES (June 27, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/06/29/real
estate/affordable-new-york-apartments-with-a-catch.html.
174. Cf. United Hous. Found. Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 846, 853–54 (1975)
(highlighting the income-boosting benefits of co-ops, including the tax benefits, which
raised a question as to whether shares in the co-op were securities).
175. See Olear, supra note 170 (referring to statement from Gregory Baggett,
executive director of the New York Council for Housing Development Fund Companies
(“NYC HDFC”), that a significant number of abandoned properties mainly “[w]ent to
private real estate developers,” nonprofit entities, and building residents — which served
as the basis for the formation of the HDFC — thus increasing the city’s tax revenues).
176. See infra note 251 and accompanying text.
177. Cf. United Hous. Found., 421 U.S. at 841 (listing the benefits afforded to tenants
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cooperative is not the same type of business decision as that made by an
investor, or a money manager on her behalf, in the stock market. For the
individual buying into an HDFC spends money or gives other consideration
to buy a home that will remain more affordable than one she can rent on the
open market.178 By contrast, the person buying into a publicly traded
company generally does not care about the specifics (if she even knows
them); all she cares about is money.179 The same point can be made by
saying that with HDFC investors, their bottom-line is affordable housing.
But this benefit is one that they cannot obtain unless they pool resources with
trustworthy individuals sharing these social values.
Historicizing the HDFC highlights its communitarian function. As best
captured in Jacqueline Leavitt and Susan Saegert’s study From
Abandonment to Hope: Community-Households in Harlem,180 studying the
formation of HDFCs in Harlem, and Malve von Hassell’s Homesteading in
New York City, 1978–1993: The Divided Heart of Loisaida,181 studying the
same in Manhattan’s Lower East Side, HDFCs arose as a response to
landlord “economically rational” neglect and abandonment, a gradual dehousing in New York City from the late 1960s to the early 1980s.182
Confronted with the choice of being gentrified out, staying put in such
dilapidation, or leaving, “many tenants stayed in their communities, some
seizing the opportunity of landlord disinvestment to take control of their own
housing . . . .”183 Specifically, neglected tenants availed themselves of
government programs to preserve their homes and rebuilt abandoned
communities by assuming the status of resident owner.184 By doing so, they
thwarted the ostensible goal of widespread neglect: to use “planned
who purchase shares in the co-op).
178. See id. at 853–54.
179. See GREENFIELD, THE FAILURE OF CORPORATE LAW, supra note 33, at 122–23.
180. JACQUELINE LEAVITT & SUSAN SAEGERT, FROM ABANDONMENT TO HOPE:
COMMUNITY-HOUSEHOLDS IN HARLEM (1990).
181. MALVE VON HASSELL, HOMESTEADING IN NEW YORK CITY, 1978–1993: THE
DIVIDED HEART OF LOISAIDA (1999).
182. See LEAVITT & SAEGERT supra note 180, at 3–4; see also David Reiss, Housing
Abandonment and New York City’s Response, 22 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 783,
787–89 (1997) (outlining how inflation, heightened housing costs, and declining public
assistance payments have contributed to New York City’s abandonment crisis); Andrea
McArdle, [Re]Integrating Community Space: The Legal and Social Meanings of
Reclaiming Abandoned Space in New York’s Lower East Side, 2 SAVANNAH L. REV.
247, 249–54, 257–59 (2015) (describing abandonment and enterprising residents’
reinvestment in deteriorating neighborhoods through their own labor, which is known as
urban homesteading).
183. LEAVITT & S AEGERT, supra note 180, at 5.
184. See VON HASSELL, supra note 181, at 2; McArdle, supra note 182, at 247–54,
257–58.
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shrinkage” as a way of razing low-income communities and transforming
them into luxury housing by skirting slum clearance or eminent domain.185
Under such government programs, New York City, default owner of
properties abandoned by capital, transferred its ownership title to HDFC
corporations, also to divest itself of responsibility for such properties.186
These entities were formed by tenants who had already been working
collectively to oppose their marginalization through rent-strikes and Article
7A proceedings to compel repairs; indeed, their collective actions often
induced capital to abandon the properties.187 These collaborating tenants
then became shareholders of a real-estate company by paying as little as
$250.188 As part of their transformation into shareholders, the tenants also
contributed labor — or “sweat equity” as it is often termed189 — by
participating in the rehabilitation of housing.190 Overall, the “sweat-equity”
urban homesteading “was a community-based response to the shortage of
affordable housing for the working poor:”191 that is, a rational response to a
market failure.
In sum, tenants, overwhelmingly low-income households of color headed
by women,192 ironically went corporate — that is, formed corporations and
became shareholders by investing a month of rent and years of labor193 — to
protect themselves from markets. And from the description, we can see that
rationality spurring this investment is fundamentally communitarian: it
conceives of incorporation as a collective action for self-protection against
market forces.194 Most tenants who bought shares in HDFCs invested in

185. See VON HASSELL, supra note 181, at 54.
186. See LEAVITT & SAEGERT, supra note 180, at 3; Reiss, supra note 182, at 787–

89 (describing efforts by the New York City Council to alleviate the abandonment crisis
through tax initiatives and the establishment of the Department of Housing Preservation
and Development).
187. See LEAVITT & S AEGERT, supra note 180, at 84–87; see also Nonko, supra note
173.
188. See LEAVITT & SAEGERT, supra note 180, at 7.
189. See McArdle, supra note 182, at 253.
190. See VON HASSELL, supra note 181, at 80–81.
191. VON HASSELL, supra note 181, at 1.
192. VON HASSELL, supra note 181, at 65 (stating that the Lower East Side
homesteaders were overwhelmingly Puerto Rican and had lower incomes than others);
LEAVITT & S AEGERT, supra note 180, at 25–30 (describing how homesteading
households were overwhelmingly Black or Hispanic and headed by women).
193. See VON HASSELL, supra note 181, at 2.
194. See Peter Marcuse, Abandonment, Gentrification, and Displacement: The
Linkages in New York City, in GENTRIFICATION OF THE CITY 172–73 (Neil Smith & Peter
Williams eds., 1986).
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corporations owning worthless, abandoned buildings.195 They did this to
secure place in a community by attaining a status to which the law accords
real power: that of a property owner. And in operating their corporation,
they sought civic and community-minded investors whom they trusted, not
just individuals who would infuse cash despite the desperate need for such
funds. The following passage from Leavitt and Saegert’s study captures the
nub of this rationality:
Tenants placed great emphasis on filling vacancies [in HDFCs] with
people who would be active and have skills. The one vacancy that
occurred after co-opting was filled with John Paynes and his wife, Martha.
Paynes, who had some experience with housing organizations and city
agencies, became the bookkeeper for the tenants’ association. The women
on the board were trying to help the wife set up a day-care center to bring
in income for the building. A beautification club to do painting and
cleaning was formed and involved many of the young people. Here, we
see the extension of domestic activities from the individual household to
the building.196

As we have hopefully come to appreciate during these continuing days of
Reconstruction,197 this rationality has roots in civil rights protests. It is that
which seeks empowerment through collective strength, evocative of
Malcolm X’s description of the business aspect of Black nationalism most
forcefully described in his April 1964 speech, “The Ballot or the Bullet.”198
The relevant portion must be quoted at length here:
The economic philosophy of black nationalism is pure and simple. It only
means that we should control the economy of our community. Why
should white people be running all the stores in our community? Why
should white people be running all the banks of our community? Why
should the economy of our community be in the hands of a white man?
Why? If a black man can’t move his store into a white community, you
tell me why a white man should move his store into a black community.
The philosophy of black nationalism involves a re-education program in
the black community in regards to economics. Our people have to be

195. See generally LEAVITT & SAEGERT, supra note 180 (exposing typical conditions
tenants faced after the deterioration of their buildings); Marcuse, supra note 194
(remarking on the general state of disrepair of the buildings that were abandoned in New
York City).
196. LEAVITT & SAEGERT, supra note 180, at 43.
197. See Alexander Manevitz, The Failures of Reconstruction Have Never Been More
Evident — Or Relevant — Than Today, WASH. POST (June 11, 2020, 6:00 AM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/2020/06/11/failures-reconstruction-havenever-been-more-evident-or-relevant-than-today/.
198. Malcolm X, The Ballot or the Bullet Speech (Apr. 3, 1964), in MALCOLM X
SPEAKS: SELECTED SPEECHES AND STATEMENTS 38–39 (George Breitman ed., 1989).
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made to see that any time you take your dollar out of your community, and
spend it in a community where you don’t live, the community where you
live will get poorer and poorer, and the community where you spend your
money will get richer and richer. Then you wonder why where you live
is always a ghetto or a slum area. And where you and I are concerned, not
only do we lose it when we spend it out of the community, but the white
man has got all our stores in the community tied up; so that though we
spend it in the community, at sundown the man who runs the store stakes
it over across town somewhere. He’s got us in a vise. So the economic
philosophy of black nationalism means in every church, in every civic
organization, in every fraternal order, it’s time now for our people to
become conscious of the importance of controlling the economy of our
community. If we own the stores, if we operate the businesses, if we try
and establish some industry in our own community, then we’re developing
to the position where we are creating employment for our own kind. Once
you gain control of the economy of your own community, then you don’t
have to picket and boycott and beg some [white person] downtown for a
job in his business.199

In a word, the HDFC’s genius is to combine the public company investor
and the labor stakeholder into one role: the shareholder. For it reflects a
conception of business purpose and economic rationality that is the
American tradition of independence and concomitant power,200 at the heart
of investment. But it contains a view of power which more recently has been
observed among people of color:
one centered on inalienable,
nonmonetizable power, and the power of individuals in a space and within a
community, rather than that which can be liquidated and traded.201 In terms
199. Id.
200. As Aziz Rana details throughout TWO FACES OF AMERICAN FREEDOM (2010),

economic independence has traditionally, for white Americans, been regarded as
essential to the concept of free, republican citizenship foundational to our political order.
See generally AZIZ RANA, TWO FACES OF AMERICAN FREEDOM (2010) (detailing the
connection between liberty and power in the United States). See, for example, page 12:
As a consequence, American settlerism was organized around four basic components.
First, in radicalizing those seventeenth-century republican ideas that were increasingly
prevalent in England, settlers came to view economic independence as the ethnical
basis of free citizenship. Centuries of Americans saw control over the instruments and
conditions of work as providing insiders with a collective experience in autonomy and
moral independence.

Id. at 12.
201. See, e.g., Thomas Boston, The Role of Black-Owned Businesses in Black
Community Development, in JOBS AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN MINORITY
COMMUNITIES 161–63 (Paul M. Ong & Anastasia Loukaitou-Sideris eds., 2006) (citing
studies that eighty percent of Black entrepreneurs surveyed in 2003 stated that the reason
for starting their own business was the desire to exercise more control over their destiny
and that Black-owned firms create more employment for Blacks than white-owned ones);
MELVIN DELGADO, LATIN SMALL BUSINESS AND THE AMERICAN DREAM 94–95 (2011)
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of progressive corporate law framework discussed above,202 this is a
rationality rejecting the loose bonds of self-interest limited solely by contract
for thicker, more personal bonds.
Most significant to the argument here, the communitarian business
corporation of the HDFC has been very successful as a counter-market
strategy. As discussed above, during the 1970s and 1980s, the formation of
HDFCs allowed Black and Brown households to preserve themselves against
the attempt to displace and gentrify through abandonment.203 In today’s
hypercommodified market204 in the global capital of real estate and
financialization,205 HDFCs endurance as affordable housing for families of
color has allowed them to remain in gentrifying neighborhoods.206 It is for
this reason that, despite the remarkable return on investment HDFC share
ownership presents, HDFC shareholders have not sold in bulk.207 Lest we
imagine this success as inevitable due to the advantage of nonexistent startup costs, the plight of similarly situated tenant enterprises in Detroit, for
example, cautions otherwise.208 Indeed, the lesson from Detroit209 is that
New York City HDFCs succeeded where others failed because their Black
and Brown economic rationality was a business model perfectly adapted to
its particular market.210
B. The Plight of Black and Brown HDFCs Within the Neoliberal Paradigm
Put in terms of the progressive critique discussed above in Section III.A,
(“[Latino] [s]mall business owners are like homeowners. They’re committed to the
neighborhood; they’re a committed citizenry. The hope is that entrepreneurship brings
more civic engagement by immigrants. That they’ll have their voices heard more. That
they’ll be anchors, developing roots in the community, and serve as role models.”).
202. See supra Section III.A.
203. See Marcuse, supra note 194, at 172–73.
204. See sources cited supra note 29 and accompanying text.
205. See sources cited supra note 29 and accompanying text.
206. See Olear, supra note 170 (quoting Rachel Christmas Derrick, Director of
Communications and Fundraising, UHAB) (“One of the things that is beautiful about
HDFC co-ops is that the people who lived in the distressed, neglected, and abandoned
buildings . . . in the ‘70s and ‘80s . . . are still there now . . . . Though sadly, many of
their neighbors in rentals are being displaced by gentrification.”).
207. See id.
208. See generally David Goldberg, From Landless to Landlords: Black Power,
Black Capitalism, and the Co-Optation of Detroit’s Tenants Rights Movement, 1964–69,
in THE BUSINESS OF BLACK POWER (Lauren Warren Hill and Julia Rabig eds., 2012)
(describing the failure of Black United Tenants for Collective Action to convert
collective action of rent-strike into a sustainable homeownership model due to the lack
of resources).
209. Id. at 158.
210. See id. at 163.
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the HDFC is the thickest type of business corporation. It is formed under an
economic rationality reflecting oppressed people’s desire to counter market
force through collective strength. Put another way, it suggests that the
viewpoint asserted in the Delaware Chancery Court decision in eBay
Domestic Holdings v. Newmark211 is flat out wrong: the “philanthropic” end
of aiding communities is the very reason why some people form a for-profit,
business corporation.212 They do so because the status of shareholder, and
the rights attendant to do, are rights that a white man is bound to respect.213
The U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in United Housing Foundation, Inc.
v. Forman214 reflects the distinction between this rationality, characteristic
of HDFC shareholders, and that characteristic of public company investors.
Reversing the Second Circuit, the Court held shares of a tenant cooperative
to be exempt from the Securities Act of 1933.215 The Court reasoned that the
Securities Act, regulating the purchase and sale of investment shares, did not
apply to a person investing for a home rather than money.216 Of course, the
home is an asset that has monetary value: this is the point that the plaintiffs
in the case relied on for the textualist argument that the Securities Act’s
definition of a “security” should capture cooperative shares.217 It is also the
point informing the Second Circuit’s reasoning that the lower housing cost
and tax benefits derived from owning shares in a cooperative involves
money, and, therefore, qualifies such shares as “securities” under the
Securities Act’s definition.218 As the Second Circuit correctly reasoned,
people buy into low-income cooperatives because it is cheaper than
renting.219 But the Court in Forman emphasizes that a cooperative is a sort
of business where the value of a home as an asset is incidental to its value as
a home; with it, the social value is absolute.220 In stark contrast, it is
211. 16 A.3d 1 (2010).
212. See infra note 252. But see eBay Domestic Holdings, 16 A.3d at 34 (“The

corporate form . . . is not an appropriate vehicle for purely philanthropic ends, at least
not when there are other stockholders interested in realizing a return on their
investment.”).
213. Cf. Civil Rights Act of 1866, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1982 (codifying and enforcing
equal rights in contract and property).
214. 421 U.S. 837 (1975).
215. Id. at 847.
216. Id. at 848.
217. See id. (rejecting respondents’ literal interpretation that because the statute
defining securities uses the language “any . . . stock” that respondents’ shares in the
cooperative should fall within it).
218. Id. at 846–47, 854–56.
219. See id. at 855.
220. See id. at 851, 853–54 (emphasizing that co-ops are affordable and provide an
opportunity for home ownership).
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unimaginable that any capitalist would invest in a company lacking equity,
and lacking any path to equity. Indeed, public markets do not even have a
place for unprofitable companies.221
Yet for this clear difference, public company governance doctrines are
applied wholesale to HDFCs. Courts continue to treat shareholders as
“passive investors” yielding total control to boards of directors. In twentyfive years, New York’s highest court — the Court of Appeals — has twice
affirmed that the BJR governs decisions of tenant cooperatives such as
HDFCs.222 In both cases, the Court of Appeals courts invoked the distinction
between “ownership” and “control”223 to reject a standard requiring boards
to show reasonableness justifying their decisions and, by that, deny
shareholders substantive review of matters affecting their homes. The Court
of Appeals has done this even though such shareholders have a stronger
interest in controlling internal corporate affairs than their investment
counterparts: the interest in preserving their homes.224 Even worse, the
Court of Appeals in its landmark Levandusky v. One Fifth Avenue Apt.
Corp.225 decision rather fancifully interprets shareholders’ investment as the
purchase of stake in a community where living decisions are through
common, centralized control.226 As if that stake, and not the quest for stable,
affordable housing in a hypercommodified real estate market, was the
dominant consideration of the typical cooperative investor.
The reasoning underlying the standard BJR simply does not apply to
companies like tenant cooperatives, where the board are volunteers227
typically drawn from the pool of resident shareholders: the Levandusky court
recognized that much.228 As such, and in contrast to management of public
221. See NYSE, COMPANY LISTING MANUAL § 802.01 (2016), https://nyse.wolters
kluwer.cloud/listed-company-manual/document?treeNodeId=csh-da-filter!WKUSTAL-DOCS-PHC-%7B0588BF4A-D3B5-4B91-94EA-BE9F17057DF0%7D-WKUS_TAL_5667%23teid-167 (stating that companies where shareholders’ equity is
less than $50,000,000 may be suspended from dealings or removed from the list).
222. See 40 W. 67th St. v. Pullman, 790 N.E.2d 1174, 1176, 1182 (N.Y. 2003);
Levandusky v. One Fifth Ave. Apt. Corp., 553 N.E.2d 1317, 1324 (N.Y. 1990).
223. See 40 W. 67th St., 790 N.E.2d at 1178–79; Levandusky, 553 N.E.2d at 1320–21.
224. The Levandusky court based its reasoning, in part, on the fact that shareholders
have the freedom not to purchase the apartment, the common argument in all disputes
about whether corporations treat shareholders any which way they desire. See supra Part
II, notes 77–83 and accompanying text.
225. 553 N.E.2d 1317 (1990).
226. See id. at 1320–21.
227. See N.Y.C. DEP’T OF HOUS. PRES. AND DEV., FACT SHEET FOR COOPERATIVE
HDFC SHAREHOLDERS 2 (2019) [hereinafter HPD FACT SHEET], https://www1.
nyc.gov/assets/hpd/downloads/pdfs/services/hdfc-coop-fact-sheet.pdf (providing that
under New York law, HDFC directors are volunteers).
228. See Levandusky, 553 N.E.2d at 1320–21.
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companies,229 the board managing a cooperative are typically no more
sophisticated or expert in the business of owning and running property than
any resident.230 Thus, there is no reason to suppose shareholders rising to
the rank of board members are any more sophisticated or incorruptible than
their neighbors. And to the extent that they ever develop “enterprise,” it is
acquired by serving as board members — the patina of longevity or
experience, as it were.
Despite this, decisions of tenant cooperative boards are subject to no
special review different to that for public companies. Nor are board
members’ similarly situated neighbors afforded any meaningful power to
scrutinize decisions. Still worse, the BJR serves to create conditions for
board entrenchment, from which corruption hails, by giving an advantage to
incumbents in power.231 The next Section elaborates the corrupting and
oppressive function of neoliberal governance on corporations like HDFCs.
C. The Harm of Universalizing Neoliberal Governance: A Case Study
The corrosive impact of the current governance paradigm, and especially
the BJR, on counter-market business corporations is best illustrated by a
case. A few years ago, I represented a group of shareholders residing at
Lindsay Park Housing Corporation, the largest Mitchell-Lama housing
cooperative in Brooklyn.232 Like an HDFC, a Mitchell-Lama housing
cooperative is a business corporation serving to counter the function of
markets. It is formed and owned by low-to-middle income Black and Brown
households, or the same segment of the population as HDFC investors,
whose created entity also owns and operates an affordable, middle-income
housing project.233 For our purposes here, the only difference between an
229. See Bainbridge, Director Primacy, supra note 34, at 559, (explaining that formal
power rests with the board of directors rather than the shareholders of a publicly traded
company).
230. See SYLVIA SHAPIRO, THE NEW YORK CO-OP BIBLE: EVERYTHING YOU NEED TO
KNOW ABOUT CO-OPS AND CONDOS: GETTING IN, STAYING IN, SURVIVING, THRIVING
172 (rev. ed. 2005) (comparing the director elections process for public companies with
the process for co-ops and condos, noting that directors of public corporations are subject
“to the glare of public scrutiny,” whereas management for co-ops and condos is “not
subject to any such competency checks”).
231. See id. at 172–73.
232. Adele Niederman, Lindsay Park Celebrates 50th Anniversary!, COOPERATORS
UNITED FOR MITCHELL LAMA (Sept. 16, 2015), https://cu4ml.com/lindsay-park-cele
brates-50th-anniversary.
233. See Julie Gilgoff, Note, Local Responses to Today’s Housing Crisis:
Permanently Affordable Housing Models, 20 CUNY L. REV. 587, 598–600 (2017);
Camille Rosca, Comment, From Affordable to Profitable: The Privatization of MitchellLama Housing & How the New York Court of Appeals Got It Wrong, 45 SETON HALL L.
REV. 945, 951–54 (2015); cf. LEAVITT & SAEGERT, supra note 180, at 25–30 (noting that
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HDFC and Mitchell-Lama is historical, as Mitchell-Lama housing arose in
the robust real estate market following World War II and out of recognition
that government intervention was needed to stimulate the private sector’s
construction of affordable housing.234
Continuing with the story, the Lindsay Park shareholders organized a
campaign to call a special meeting for amending Lindsay Park’s bylaws to
prohibit the use of proxies in board elections.235 The point of this was to
further the corporation’s purpose and preserve the affordable housing
through corporate governance: namely, by bringing accountability to an
entrenched board led by a corrupt president who, as a former educator, had
no especial expertise in housing. Indeed, reflecting this apparent
incompetence, she was doing a rather poor job: for reasons that will become
clear shortly, her decade-long reign as board president saw significant
increases in maintenance costs, serving to nullify many long-term residents’
investment in affordable housing.236
The shareholders’ reform campaign sought to address the riddle of how a
disastrous board president nonetheless managed to be so consistently and
overwhelmingly re-elected.237 The proxy system at Lindsay Park conduced
a vicious cycle where the board president’s reign was perpetuated by proxy
votes. She in turn was widely accused of sanctioning under-the-table
apartment sales, which violate restrictions governing sales in Mitchell-Lama
cooperatives.238 Information that many shareholders had obtained suggested
that she did this in exchange for, at least, the incoming shareholders’ pledge
of their proxy to her; and with these proxies, she re-elected herself and
surrounded herself with a board beholden unto servility.239 With each such
homesteading households were Black and Hispanic-dominated).
234. See Robert W. Snyder, Lower Rents: A History Lesson, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Jul.
13, 2018, 5:00 AM), https://www.nydailynews.com/opinion/ny-oped-historys-lesonsfor-slowing-rent-hikes-20180712-story.html (discussing the passage of the MitchellLama Act). Compare N.Y. PRIV. HOUS. FIN. LAW § 11 (McKinney 2021) (supporting
Mitchell-Lama’s recognizing need for private enterprise to be incentivized to build lowincome housing), with id. § 571 (supporting HDFCs and recognizing the need for
coordination among federal, state, and local governments and private actors to increase
the supply of housing for low-income persons, improving quality of life in state).
235. See Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 2, 9, Gonzalez v. Been,
Index No. 653242/2014 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Oct. 23, 2014) (NYSCEF Doc. No. 1) [hereinafter
Complaint].
236. See id. at 2.
237. See id. at 12–14 (describing the process by which the board president allegedly
obtained votes and proxy votes and noting that in 2013, despite only 350 shareholders
voting by live ballot, the incumbent president received 1,275 votes).
238. See RULES OF THE CITY OF N.Y. tit. 28, § 3-02(h)(13) (2021) (stating selections
for next person to rent from apartment must be drawn from waiting list).
239. See Complaint, supra note 235, at 13–14.
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campaign cycle, she obtained even more proxies to secure deeper
entrenchment.
When the shareholder campaign had succeeded in collecting enough
shareholder signatures to support a petition, the board made the wholly
predictable move that absolute power does: it invented a “signature
verification” procedure that just so happened to nullify enough votes to bring
the tally below the threshold for triggering a special meeting.240 Undeterred,
shareholders commenced a lawsuit challenging this obvious abuse of power
and attempt to evade accountability, loading their complaint with the entire
gestalt, including clear evidence of the president’s flagrant corruption.241
The trial court, presided over by a justice raised in Black, home-owning
Queens, immediately got it.242 She denied the Lindsay Park’s summary
judgment motion on the BJR and ordered discovery on the board’s invented
review procedure.243 Yet when the cooperative appealed, an appellate court
panel, constituted differently, reversed the trial court by perfunctorily
applying the BJR to uphold the board gambit,244 insulating it from
meaningful scrutiny.
But the story did not end there. About a year after the BJR served to leave
shareholders disenfranchised and end their attempt at salutary governance,
the board president was arrested and eventually convicted for participating
in a commercial bribery scheme.245 The scheme specifically involved her,
and the two heads of the management team that the board hired and paid,
receiving a kickback from a corporate vendor who overcharged the company
for repairs.246 Naturally, this cost was recouped from tenants in the form of
the very maintenance increases that reformers cited as part of the corruption
they sought to deter with accountability.247 The kickback scheme
contributed to inflated repair costs reflected in Lindsay Park’s financial
records.248
240. See id. at 11–12.
241. See id. at 13–15.
242. Gonzalez v. Been, No. 653242/14, 2015 WL 3961752, at *1 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. June

30, 2015).
243. Id.
244. See Gonzalez v. Been, 41 N.Y.S.3d 700, 701 (App. Div. 2016) (reversing trial
court).
245. Benjamin Fang, Former Lindsay Park Co-Op President Sentenced for
Corruption, GREENPOINT STAR (Jan. 30, 2018), http://www.greenpointstar.com/view/
full_story/27537861/article-Former-Lindsay-Park-co-op-president-sentenced-forcorruption.
246. Id.
247. See id.
248. Id.
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This Lindsay Park episode is an account of how neoliberal governance
doctrines cost investors in business corporations such as HDFCs the very
benefit of their investment. But, sadly, the problem is evident even in more
mundane contexts, without this anfractuous criminality. For example, I have
also represented shareholders at two other low-income housing cooperatives
in Brooklyn — these both HDFCs — where directors who did not even
reside at the cooperative249 jeopardized its very existence by failing to pay
water and tax bills.250 Based on the broader social context, it was clear that
their malfeasance was really a ploy seeking to force out older residents to
sell units to wealthier gentrifiers and, thereby, turn a profit. In New York
City, this gambit carries a tremendous risk to everyone since the government
has the authority, under the TPT, to foreclose upon properties owing taxes
and utilities and transfer property title to private or nonprofit corporations.251
But even when the board creates a problem, neoliberal governance doctrines
protect them in pursuing “solutions” that harm investors. For example, the
BJR has been applied to protect boards in taking out loans causing
maintenance increases beyond levels affordable to elderly residents instead
of taking government assistance that would solve the problem in a manner
more consistent with the corporation’s purpose.252
In sum, neoliberal governance rules defeat even the thickest conception of
249. Generally, shareholders and directors are required to reside at the cooperative.
See HPD FACT SHEET, supra note 227, at 2.
250. See Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief and Damages at 8, Coronel
v. 350–52 South 4 Street Hous. Dev. Fund Corp., Index No. 8083/2014 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
May 21, 2014) (NYSCEF Doc. No. 14).
251. For the legal authority of the Third Party Transfer Program (“TPT”), see RULES
OF THE CITY OF N.Y. tit. 28, § 8-01 (2021) (enacted pursuant to N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE tit.
11, § 11-401 (2021)). It is the corollary of government policy, discussed above in Olear,
leading to the transfer of abandoned property to HDFCs. As we might expect, TPT
operates to disproportionately divest Black and Brown homeowners, and as such, are
disproportionately affected by such divestment. See Claudia Irizzary Aponte, Brooklyn
Foreclosures Must Stick, City Lawyers Argue, THE CITY (May 2, 2019, 4:00 AM),
https://thecity.nyc/2019/05/brooklyn-third-party-transfer-foreclosures-must-stickcity.html; Claudia Irizzary Aponte, City Task Force to Take Fresh Look at Feared
Foreclosure Program, THE CITY (June 14, 2019, 2:57 PM), https://thecity.nyc/
2019/06/city-task-force-to-take-fresh-look-at-foreclosure-program.html.
252. See generally Cannings v. E. Midtown Plaza Hous. Co., No. 401071/10, 2011
WL 5142033 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Cnty. Oct. 18, 2011), aff’d, 960 N.Y.S.2d 413 (App. Div.
2013) (upholding board decision to take out loan to obtain repairs even though funding
for repairs was obtainable through a public, government grant conditioning funds on
extending affordability requirements). An unstated premise is that boards can avoid the
condition of much government assistance — that the HDFC agrees to enter into a
regulatory agreement with the government in exchange for assistance. However, since
the regulatory agreement would preserve affordability by the imposition of flip taxes and
government oversight, it is still more consistent with corporate purpose than the
alternative of market financing. See N.Y. PRIV. HOUS. FIN. LAW § 576 (McKinney 2021).
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a corporation that has been effective in countering markets. But unlike with
public companies, the standard recourse — which assumes liquidity — is
meaningless to shareholding tenants seeking to defend their corporation as a
society. Selling shares costs them an affordable home, the very thing that
they invested for.253 Yet neoliberal governance leaves them helpless in a
society diluted by irresponsible boards, until the market tide eventually
washes them out.
V. THE CURRENT PROGRESSIVE REFORM STRUCTURES FOR
PRIVATE COMPANIES AND THEIR LIMITS
The discussion of neoliberal governance’s effect on HDFC rationality
raises the question of what corporate governance structure is most
appropriate for it. Before turning to this Article’s proposals, we examine
progressive scholarship’s ideas on governance reform of private companies,
not the public ones on which progressive corporate law focuses.
As an overview, aside from the constituency statute,254 these progressive
private company reforms have been placed under the rubric of “social
enterprise.”255 This term refers to the use of organizations to achieve social
goals through business methods.256 The tendency of scholars has been to
regard the progressive solution as one of structures.257 At the strict level of

253. See United Hous. Found. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 846–57 (1975).
254. See Roberta Romano, The States As a Laboratory: Legal Innovation and State

Competition for Corporate Charters, 23 YALE J. ON REG. 209, 215 (2006) (counting
thirty-one states with other constituent statutes); see also Millon, Redefining Corporate
Law, supra note 91, at, 266–68 (setting forth principles of how constituency statutes
should be interpreted to accomplish the purposes for which they were enacted).
255. Dana Brakman Reiser, Theorizing Forms for Social Enterprise, 62 EMORY L.J.
681, 682 (2013) [hereinafter Reiser, Theorizing Forms for Social Enterprise].
256. See id. (describing the impact “social enterprises” can have on society compared
to profit-generating and nonprofit corporations due to the combination of the business
methods found in profit-generating corporations and the social goals found in
nonprofits); see also Antony Page & Robert A. Katz, Is Social Enterprise the New
Corporate Social Responsibility?, 34 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1351, 1352–53 (2011)
(describing progressive corporate law as “a collection of proposals aimed at remaking
corporate law to encourage processes and outcomes more beneficial to the interests of
[stakeholders or] nonshareholders with significant stakes in a corporation’s activities” as
“the most muscular and structural interaction of [corporate social responsibility]” and
contending that the social enterprise movement is connected to corporate social
responsibility).
257. See Reiser, Theorizing Forms for Social Enterprise, supra note 255, at 683
(describing how, across the county and around the globe, jurisdictions have begun to
respond to the claims that traditional for-profit and nonprofit legal forms frustrate social
entrepreneurs’ bold vision for achieving social change by offering a variety of
specialized legal forms intended to house social enterprises).
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corporate law,258 scholars have promoted the use of two alternative structures
as reform: the old, familiar form of nonprofit corporation, and the newer,
more obscure form of the public benefit corporation. Both are considered
and critiqued below.
A. The Traditional Alternative: The Nonprofit Corporation and Its Limits
American law’s longstanding structure for protecting and advancing social
and non-monetary enterprise is the nonprofit corporation.259 Legal
scholarship and decisional law have arrived at this view both affirmatively
and negatively. The affirmative claim is that the non-distribution constraint
governing such entities260 makes them best suited to provide public goods
that the market will not.261 Put differently, the claim is that they are
structured in a manner inspiring more confidence that they can better deliver
public goods and services than for-profit entities.262 The negative view,
epitomized by the Delaware Chancery Court’s discussion in eBay Domestic
Holdings, Inc. v. Newmark,263 assumes that anyone seeking to operate an
entity for philanthropic ends should not form it as a for-profit business
corporation lest they cheat investors.264 This leaves the nonprofit, with its
hallmark non-distribution constraint, as the default option.265
One essential point to clear up, and to explain why an article on business
258. This Article excludes discussion of limited liability companies (“LLCs”),
including the low-profit limited liability company (“L3C”), and the benefit limited
liability company. Discussion of LLCs — which are commonly regarded to be more like
partnerships — would go beyond the scope of this Article.
259. Fishman, supra note 172, at 630–31 (“As early as the seventeenth century the
[nonprofit] corporation was used in the New World as an organizational form for
charitable activities . . . . Almost all colonial corporations had charitable purposes. They
were churches, charities, educational institutions, or municipal corporations . . . . Many
of the colonial business corporations would be considered cooperatives or quasiphilanthropic today.”).
260. See Henry B. Hansmann, The Role of Nonprofit Enterprise, 89 YALE L.J. 835,
838 (1980) [hereinafter Hansmann, The Role of Nonprofit Enterprise].
261. Id. at 873 (stressing the non-distribution constraint as “the essential characteristic
that permits nonprofit organizations to serve effectively as a response to contract
failure”).
262. See id. at 844–45 (arguing that, according to economic theory, lack of profit
incentive renders nonprofits more desirable market participants). But see Dana Brakman
Reiser, For-Profit Philanthropy, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 2437, 2452–54 (2009) (describing
Google’s development of a division within its for-profit entity dedicated to philanthropy
as a means of being free to invest in for-profit business pursuing philanthropic goals and
avoiding restrictions on that division’s ability to access Google resources, and on
political activities).
263. 16 A.3d 1 (Del. Ch. 2010).
264. See id. at 34.
265. See Hansmann, The Role of Nonprofit Enterprise, supra note 260, at 838.

120

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY BUSINESS LAW REVIEW

Vol. 10:1

corporation reform is discussing nonprofit corporations, is the economic
nature of nonprofit firms. Many people who work for social services
nonprofits suppose the nonprofit’s quiddity to be something amounting to
“socialism” or “mendicancy.”266 Nothing could be further from the truth.
Nonprofits are businesses, rather big and sophisticated businesses, in fact.267
Many, referred to as “commercial nonprofits” in scholarship, quite explicitly
rely on sales revenue to sustain operations for the mission.268 Along these
lines, the law has routinely cautioned that it is a mistake to regard nonprofits
as anything other than profit-generating businesses.269 Indeed, they meet the
definition of “social enterprises” precisely because, like business
corporations, they use business methods to advance their social missions.270
The only difference is that, with nonprofits, corporate profits are not
supposed to go into the pockets of their owners or other individuals; instead,
corporate profits should be applied to further the entity’s purpose or
mission.271
Despite all this, there are two reasons why nonprofits have never served
to revolutionize corporate law and change the way that people think about
business law generally. First, because nonprofits lack shareholders272 and
are subject to the non-distribution constraint,273 they cannot offer investors
266. See Gail A. Lasprogata & Marya N. Cotten, Contemplating “Enterprise”: The
Business and Legal Challenges of Social Entrepreneurship, 41 AM. BUS. L.J. 67, 87–88
(2003) (noting a primary concern for many social service nonprofit organizations is the
disconnect between service and supporting the enterprise as opposed to earning a profit).
267. See, e.g., Henry J. Hansmann, The Rationale for Exempting Nonprofit
Organizations from Corporate Income Taxation, 91 YALE L.J. 54, 54–55 (1981)
[hereinafter Hansmann, The Rationale for Exempting Nonprofit Organizations] (stating
that nonprofit organizations now more commonly resemble the for-profit sector and even
compete with for-profit companies in various industries); Lasprogata & Cotten, supra
note 266, at 67 (providing that the economic impact of nonprofit organizations amounts
to $700 billion annually and over $1 trillion in assets); Felix Salmon, Introducing the
Slate 90: A Dive into the Multibillion-Dollar Nonprofit Sector, SLATE (May 10, 2018,
5:50 AM), https://slate.com/business/2018/05/nonprofits-need-more-scrutiny-enter-theslate-90.html.
268. See Robert A. Katz & Antony Page, Sustainable Business, 62 EMORY L.J. 851,
855 (2013) (quoting Hansmann, The Role of Nonprofit Enterprise, supra note 260, at
840–41).
269. See Am. Baptist Churches of Metro. N.Y. v. Galloway, 710 N.Y.S.2d 12, 14–15
(App. Div. 2000).
270. See id. at 15 (“Just as the goal of a for-profit corporation is to make money for
its investors, the goal of a not-for-profit is to make money that can be spent on furthering
its social welfare objectives.”).
271. See id.; Fishman, supra note 172, at 630–31.
272. See N.Y. NOT-FOR-PROFIT CORP. LAW § 501 (McKinney 2021) (prohibiting
nonprofits from issuing equity).
273. Id. §§ 102(a)(5), 204.
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anything but tax deductions274 or, in some cases, tax credits as part of an
affordable housing project.275 Their main “investors” are: (1) their
individual members paying dues, which also includes members of the limited
nonprofit, tax-exempt entities that are permitted to distribute profits to such
members;276 (2) governments that pay nonprofit corporations to exercise
public welfare functions;277 or (3) private persons, and the pools of their
wealth known as foundations, who may wish to support the business of
charity.278 As mentioned before, nonprofits can also obtain income from
sales revenue and other commercial activities,279 but that is not investment.280
Outside of the affordable housing venture, nonprofits fail to attract folks
looking to invest capital or anything else counting as consideration under the
law.281 As a result of this, they are not thought to be relevant to discussions
about how business law can be reformed to advance nonmonetary
274. See VICTORIA B. BJORKLUND ET AL., NEW YORK NONPROFIT LAW AND
PRACTICE: WITH TAX ANALYSIS § 20.01 (2d ed. 2013) (discussing restrictions on
nonprofits related to charitable contributions).
275. See Megan J. Ballard, Profiting from Poverty: The Competition Between ForProfit and Nonprofit Developers for Low-Income Housing Tax Credits, 55 HASTINGS
L.J. 211, 233 (2003) (citing I.R.C. § 501(c)(3)) (“The Internal Revenue Code prohibits
the payment of profits from a tax-exempt charity to shareholders, members, or
individuals.”).
276. See BJORKLUND ET AL., supra note 274, § 1.02 n.8 (“There are some specialized
New York nonprofit corporations to which the nondistribution constraint [under I.R.C.
501I(3) and Treas. Res. 1.501(c)(3)] does not strictly apply. These include cooperative
corporations and public housing finance corporations.”). I note here that this exception
includes the tenant cooperatives discussed in Part IV above.
277. See Elizabeth T. Boris & C. Eugene Steuerle, Scope and Dimension of the
Nonprofit Sector, in THE NON-PROFIT SECTOR: A RESEARCH HANDBOOK 74–75 (Walter
W. Powell & Richard Steinberg eds., 2d ed. 2006) (discussing government funding of
nonprofits).
278. See BETSY SCHMIDT, NONPROFIT LAW: THE LIFE CYCLE OF A CHARITABLE
ORGANIZATION 255 (2011).
279. See Hansmann, The Rationale for Exempting Nonprofit Organizations, supra
note 267, at 58–62.
280. New York also allows not-for-profit entities to induce capital contributions from
insiders (members) and from outsiders through a device termed a “subvention.” But
since they basically are subordinate debt securities, financing obtained through the use
of them should not be considered an investment. See N.Y. NOT-FOR-PROFIT CORP. §§
502–505 (McKinney 2021); BJORKLUND ET AL., supra note 274, § 5.05[2]–[3].
(discussing capital contributions for members of nonprofit corporations and
subventions).
281. See, e.g., N.Y. BUS. CORP. LAW § 504(a) (McKinney 2021) (“Consideration for
the issue of shares shall consist of money or other property, tangible or intangible; labor
or services actually received by or performed for the corporation or for its benefit or in
its formation or reorganization; a binding obligation to pay the purchase price or the
subscription price in cash or other property; a binding obligation to perform services
having an agreed value; or a combination thereof.”).
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considerations.282
As a second problem, the nonprofit corporation is not a particularly
effective structure for protecting its beneficiaries from market forces. This
is because its beneficiaries are at the mercy of nonprofit directors as they
have no legal remedy against board decisions undermining a nonprofit’s
purpose and mission.283 In jurisdictions like New York, beneficiaries can try
to increase their power and leverage by becoming nonprofit “members,” or
assuming a governance role roughly equivalent to shareholders’ in business
corporations.284 However, as we saw of shareholders in business
corporations under the neoliberal order, this practically means the reign of
directors, who are especially dominant in the nonprofit realm since most
nonprofits lack members.285 As with for-profit entities, nonprofit boards
remain largely free and unfettered to give their own meaning to corporate
purpose and function.286 Still worse, they are even authorized to exercise
power that undermines members’ major control: their power to elect
directors.287
This reflects how much New York’s Not-For-Profit
Corporation Law is modelled after the BCL and imports its public-company
concept of board supremacy.288 The upshot of all this is that nonprofit
corporations are a “third way” between the public sector and private
282. See Reiser, Theorizing Forms for Social Enterprise, supra note 255, at 683 (“If
[a founder] forms a for-profit, particularly a for-profit corporation, shareholder primacy
will force her to single-mindedly focus on profit, with no way to protect the social
mission of the entity or its founders. If she forms a nonprofit, this social vision can be
protected, but business strategies, especially equity capital, are foreclosed.”).
283. See Alco Gravure v. Knapp Found., 479 N.E.2d 752, 755 (N.Y. 1985)
(analogizing New York not-for-profit corporations to trusts and applying the general rule
that “one who is merely a possible beneficiary of a charitable trust, or a member of a
class of possible beneficiaries, is not entitled to sue for enforcement of the trust” or
nonprofit); Kemp’s Bus Serv., Inc. v. Livingston-Wyo. Chapter of NYSARC, Inc., 701
N.Y.S.2d 575, 575 (App. Div. 1999) (“[The] Not-For-Profit Corporation Law was
enacted to protect defendant [corporation] and its members, not plaintiff [bus service
vendor].”); BJORKLUND ET AL., supra note 274, § 11.05[1][a] (“In New York, as in most
jurisdictions, beneficiaries of an organization . . . cannot sue [to enforce directors’
duties].”).
284. BJORKLUND ET AL., supra note 274, § 9.01. Members can be individuals or
entities. See N.Y. NOT-FOR-PROFIT CORP. LAW § 601.
285. See N.Y. NOT-FOR-PROFIT CORP. LAW § 601 (noting that charitable corporations
are not required to have members); see also BJORKLUND ET AL., supra note 274, § 9.01.
286. See Van Campen v. Olean Gen. Hosp., 205 N.Y.S. 554, 554–55, 557–58 (App.
Div. 1924), aff’d, 147 N.E. 219, 219 (N.Y. 1925) (emphasizing the court’s inability to
interfere with actions taken by the board in furtherance of the corporation unless clearly
erroneous).
287. See Bailey v. Am. Soc’y for Prevention of Cruelty to Animals, 125 N.Y.S.2d 18,
24–25 (App. Div. 1953), aff’d, 120 N.E.2d 853, 854 (N.Y. 1954) (holding that directors’
adoption of bylaws allowing their self-perpetuation did not violate members’ powers).
288. See BJORKLUND ET AL., supra note 274, § 9.01.
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businesses.289 Nonprofit corporations are not the key to reconceptualizing
business corporation law.
B. The Innovation: The Benefit Corporation and Its Limits
Perhaps recognizing these limitations on nonprofits, thirty-seven states
have passed benefit corporation statutes creating a hybrid corporate structure
with monetary and non-monetary purposes.290 New York’s benefit
corporation statutory scheme — contained in Article 17 of its Business
Corporation Law — seeks to address the problem of monetary reduction by
codifying others’ interests.291
Specifically, the New York benefit
corporation statute, which has been cited as a model for other states,292
provides that “[e]very [such] corporation shall have a purpose of creating
general public benefit” (in addition to any other lawful business purpose) and
that the general public benefit shall limit, and prevail over, any other or
inconsistent corporate purpose.293 It also requires the “directors and officers
of [such] a corporation [to] consider the effects of any action upon:”
(A) the ability of the benefit corporation to accomplish its general and any
specific public benefit purpose; (B) the shareholders of the benefit
corporation; (C) the employees and workforce of the benefit corporation
and its subsidiaries and suppliers; (D) the interests of customers as
beneficiaries of the general or specific public benefit purposes of the
benefit corporation; (E) community and societal considerations, including
those of any community in which offices or facilities of the benefit
corporation or its subsidiaries or supplies are located; (F) the local and
global environment; and (G) the short-term and long-term interests of the
benefit corporation . . . .294

At first blush, the benefit corporation seems promising. The statute
creating benefit corporations mandates board recognition of the
nonmonetary, social, and even counter-capitalism function of entities.295 As
such, it reflects and advances an approach to business and of economic
289. See THOMAS WOLF, MANAGING A NONPROFIT ORGANIZATION 6–7 (21st ed.
2012) (describing the nonprofit corporation’s mediating standing).
290. See Ofer Eldar, Designing Business Forms to Pursue Social Goals, 106 VA. L.
REV. 937, 964 (2020) (citing State by State Status of Legislation, B-LAB, BENEFIT CORP.,
https://benefitcorp.net/policymakers/state-by-state-status (last visited Feb. 5, 2021)).
291. N.Y BUS. CORP. LAW §§ 1701–09 (McKinney 2021).
292. See Reiser, Theorizing Forms for Social Enterprise, supra note 255, at 704
(stating that specialized form legislation should follow New York’s lead and “clearly
state that only social enterprises that prioritize social good may adopt the specialized
form[]”).
293. N.Y BUS. CORP. LAW § 1706(a).
294. Id. § 1707(a)(1).
295. See id.
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rationality liberated from the neoliberal paradigm: namely, team or “we”
rationality. This is a perspective, associated with Black, Brown, and
marginalized people around the world, that has gained traction in Europe and
the United States.296
The ultimate problem with the benefit corporation, however, is that its
liberated understanding of business is consigned to corporate “contracts”
such as the articles or certificate of incorporation. As such, it leaves change
to bargaining, rather than imposing it as a substantive principle. This point
can be expressed with the same criticism as that made of standard
progressive corporate law: the lack of a corporate governance theory, or
rules that apply where contracts are insufficient.297 In many ways, the benefit
corporation worsens the neoliberal director principle by making everything
dependent upon directors.298
Since, then, private company progressive reform depends upon the benefit
corporation, it can be stymied simply by investors’ refusal to invest. And it
296. See, e.g., Solomon, supra note 110, at 281–303 (describing the corporation Ben
& Jerry Homemade, Inc. as modelling a humanonics approach, or the running of business
as the “reflection of our conscious caring for the people around us”); Robert T. Esposito,
The Social Enterprise Revolution in Corporate Law: A Primer on Emerging Corporate
Entities in Europe and the United States and the Case for the Benefit Corporation, 4
WM. & MARY BUS. L. REV. 639, 671–95 (2013) (describing Europe as the birthplace of
modern social enterprise, with its social cooperative and community interest company
forms, and forms in the United States such as low-profit limited liability companies
(“L3C”), flexible purpose corporation (“FPC”), social purpose corporation (“SPC”), and
benefit corporation); Luigino Bruni, Toward an Economic Rationality “Capable of
Communion,” in TOWARD A MULTI-DIMENSIONAL ECONOMIC CULTURE: THE ECONOMY
OF COMMUNION 41–67 (Luigino Bruni ed., 2002) (describing economic “We” rationality
based in the work of Martin Hollis and Robert Sugden that invites a person, in deciding
which action to undertake, not to think about whether the action has good consequences
for individuals but rather whether their part in action has good consequences for us);
LORNA GOLD, NEW FINANCIAL HORIZONS: THE EMERGENCE OF AN ECONOMY OF
COMMUNION 13–31 (2010) (introducing the economy of communion, tying fiscal crisis
and economic instability to the notion of economic self-interest under the homo
economicus paradigm and proposing alternatives informed by the developing world’s
perspectives reflecting different economic rationality based in value and social solidarity
instead of self-interest). See generally JOHN GALLAGHER & JEANNE BUCKEYE,
STRUCTURES OF GRACE: THE BUSINESS PRACTICES OF THE ECONOMY OF COMMUNION
(2014) (studying business, marketing, and competitive practices and governance of
fourteen companies throughout the United States and Canada reflecting such economy
of communion principles: Mundell & Associates and Sofira Violins (Indianapolis, IN),
Finish Line (Hyde Park, NY), Terra Nuova (Rhinebeck, NY), First Fruits Farm (Los
Angeles, CA), Dealerflow (Kokomo, IN), Ideal Safety Communication (Chicago, IL),
Netutive (Reston, VA), Spiritours (Montreal, QB), Arc-en-Saisons (Granby, QB), La
Parola (Denver, Co.), The Solinsky Financial Group (Tuscon, AZ), Techquest, Inc.
(Houston, TX), and CHB Consulting (Freehold, NJ)).
297. See Bodie, supra note 70, at 752.
298. See id. at 750–51 (explaining the expanded discretionary authority of directors
under the stakeholder theory and the constituency statute).
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makes sense that investors would avoid the benefit corporation since it
reproduces neoliberal’s director primacy but frees directors of the one
constraint serving to ensure that they serve investor’s interests: the
shareholder welfare maximization norm.299 Since shareholders have long
been solicitous of channeling board discretion toward serving investor
interests,300 it is hard to see why shareholders would sign on to a structure
authorizing boards to exercise power for someone else’s benefit. The
complete absence of decisional law reflecting disputes under New York’s
public benefit statute301 suggests that this project too has failed to shift the
paradigm.
But even if the benefit corporation appealed to investors, a second problem
lurks: the issue of enforcement against dissenters. The question is how
effective radical contracts can be within the neoliberal paradigm.
Scholarship has suggested that enforcement is the problem of benefit
corporations.302 I suspect that scholars have arrived at this conclusion by
looking at the fate of other contractual terms reflecting social values in
corporate law. To take an example, federal securities law implies certain
governance rights for shareholders such as the right to participate by
including policy proposals in proxy materials.303 But as exemplified by

299. See Bainbridge, In Defense of the Shareholder Wealth Maximization Norm,
supra note 63, at 1423.
300. See Bainbridge, Director Primacy, supra note 34, at 576–77 (noting that
shareholders have sought to constrain director discretion in public companies by
compensating directors with stock, thus incentivizing the corporation to operate under
the shareholder welfare maximization principle); KRAAKMAN ET AL., supra note 38, §
3.3.2 (discussing the reward-based compensation structure for managers).
301. See DIAMOND, supra note 159, at 26–28, 761.
302. See Dana Brakman Reiser, Benefit Corporations — A Sustainable Form of
Organization?, 46 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 591, 592–93 (2011) (“[L]ike the other hybrid
forms simultaneously under development, the benefit corporation lacks robust
mechanisms to enforce dual mission, which will ultimately undermine its ability to
expand funding streams and create a strong brand for social enterprise as sustainable
organizations.”).
303. Regulations implementing the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 explain the right
as follows: “(i): If I have complied with the procedural requirements, on what other
bases may a company rely to exclude my proposal? (1) Improper under state law: If the
proposal is not a proper subject for action by shareholders under the laws of the
jurisdiction of the company’s organization; Note to paragraph (I)(1): Depending on the
subject matter, some proposals are not considered proper under state law if they would
be binding on the company if approved by shareholders. In our experience, most
proposals that are cast as recommendations or requests that the board of directors take
specified action are proper under state law. Accordingly, we will assume that a proposal
drafted as a recommendation or suggestion is proper unless the company demonstrates
otherwise.” 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(h)(3)(i) (2020).
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Apache Corporation v. NYC Employees Retirement System,304 these rights
are analyzed through a neoliberal lens. In the case, a Delaware independent
energy corporation headquartered in Houston, Texas sought a declaratory
judgment in federal court that it properly excluded the proposal of five
shareholders, all New York City pension funds, from its proxy materials.305
The proxy proposal invited all of the company’s shareholders to vote on a
proposal requesting that the corporation adopt a policy against
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation and gender identity.306 The
company refused to include it, invoking Rule 14a-8(i)(7) of the Securities
and Exchange Commission (“SEC”)’s Rules implementing the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934.307 That rule allows regulated corporations to exclude
proposals related to the company’s ordinary business operations.308 In
establishing what “ordinary business operations” means, the district court, in
following Second Circuit precedent, interpreted the law de novo, rather than
simply affirming the SEC’s exclusion action and the interpretation implied
within.309 Relying on SEC guidance, the court held the “ordinary business
operation” exception to permit the exclusion of mundane matters involving
significant policy issues that nonetheless involve what it described as
micromanagement of a business.310 For the court, proposals about
significant
policy
issues
were
nonetheless
excludable
as
“micromanagement” when proposals prevent management from exercising
its “specialized talents,”311 that familiar justification for the BJR.312 As a
result, the court determined that, because the proposal at issue in the case
included some principles that did not implicate social policy, and because
those which did nonetheless constituted “micromanagement” because they
directed the board to change certain business practices, the corporation could
rightly exclude it.313 This was so despite the proposal being, on its face, a
request that is nonbinding by its nature314 (and, therefore, incapable of
304.
305.
306.
307.
308.
309.
310.
311.

621 F. Supp. 2d 444 (S.D. Tex. 2008).
Id. at 445–46.
See id. at 446–47 (referring to the full text of the proposal).
See id. at 446, 449 (citing 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(i)(7) (2008)).
17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(i)(7); see also Apache Corp., 621 F. Supp. 3d at 449.
See Apache Corp., 621 F. Supp. 3d at 449–50.
Id. at 451.
Id. (citing Med. Comm. for Hum. Rts. v. SEC, 432 F.2d 659, 679 (D.C. Cir.
1970), vacated as moot 404 U.S. 403 (1972)) (“As one court explained, ‘management
cannot exercise its specialized talents effectively if corporate investors assert the power
to dictate the minutiae of daily business decisions.’”).
312. See id.
313. Id. at 452–53.
314. See Sarah C. Haan, Shareholder Proposal Settlements and the Private Ordering
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managing whatsoever) and clearly a social policy issue.315
Apache is thus doubly concerning. As a case about textual interpretation,
it reveals corporate law’s tendency to narrow law-and-economics
construction of express and implied contractual rights.316 As a case
developing the meaning of management prerogatives, it suggests that the
neoliberal view of director supremacy prevails over non-directors’
contractual rights. Accordingly, the case cautions that even if the benefit
corporation caught on in the market as an attractive business vehicle, its
socially useful ends would still have to overcome judicial conceptualization
of their function. This brings us to consider what might be a more effective
path to securing progressive reform.
VI. AN ALTERNATIVE REFORM PROGRAM: JUDICIAL AND
LEGISLATIVE CHANGE BASED ON THE HDFC
Neoliberalism governance cannot be solved merely with tweaks or
structures.317 The tweaks discussed in Section III.A above, including
following Germany in adding stakeholders to corporate boards, adopting
agency law’s fiduciary standard, shifting default rules to serve workers, and
rethinking boards as relational mediators, have not taken. As for structures,
the simplest argument against them is that their longstanding existence has

of Public Elections, 126 YALE L.J. 262, 273 (2016) (“[M]ost shareholder proposals —
and virtually all social and environmental proposals — are precatory, which means that
they are recommendations and are not binding on management.”).
315. See Apache Corp., 621 F. Supp. 2d at 450–53. See generally Joseph A. Roy,
Note, Non-Traditional Activism: Using Shareholder Proposals to Urge LGBT
Nondiscrimination Protection, 74 BROOK. L. REV. 1513 (2009) (explaining that
workplace discrimination is a clear, significant social policy issue).
316. Quite sensibly, no one ever feels that badly for banks and billionaires, but the
infamous case of Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. v. RJR Nabisco, Inc. reflects this
judicial tendency in corporate law to read contracts exceedingly narrowly given the
sophistication of parties. See 716 F. Supp. 1504, 1518–19 (S.D.N.Y. 1989), vacated,
906 F.2d 884 (2d. Cir. 1990). But as one commentator has said, this “if it isn’t prohibited
then it is permitted” approach is too simplistic. See John C. Coffee, Jr., Unstable
Coalitions: Corporate Governance As a Multi-Player Game, 78 GEO. L.J. 1495, 1503
(1990). A narrow approach to contracts also pervades Local 1330 United Steel Workers
v. United States Steel Corp., a case Kent Greenfield relies upon in urging the need for
public company reform giving workers a seat on corporate boards as they cannot protect
their interests with contracts. See GREENFIELD, THE FAILURE OF CORPORATE LAW, supra
note 33, at 194, n.19 (citing Local 1330, United Steel Workers v. U.S. Steel Corp., 631
F.2d 1264, 1277 (6th Cir. 1980)).
317. See generally Katz & Page, supra note 268 (arguing that because none of the
new structures have any enforcement mechanisms, the most important factor for
producing enforceable change in corporate law is getting the people in charge, including
investors, on board).
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not served to displace neoliberalism’s normative dominance.318 Two reasons
account for why theorizing tweaks and structures has not worked. First,
theory is generally a tough sell, but especially so in an area of the law so very
concerned with practical outcomes for everyone.319 Second, the legal
problem is more substantive than procedural. The real change needed is at
the cultural level. Structures are helpful in the consideration of culture as
they signal social acceptability and reduce transaction costs.320 But structure,
itself, is not culture.
So, successful reform requires two things. First, it must rely on something
tried and true here in the United States to allay concerns about feasibility,
since public companies succeed as businesses under the current governance
paradigm. Second, it must be centered on the cultural element since that is
what neoliberalism governance is missing. These two reasons are why
reform should be based on the HDFC. As discussed in Section IV.A, they
have a proven track record of success in the crucible of New York City’s
market, satisfying the element of corporate law concerned about equity
investors. But as also mentioned, they epitomize the communitarian culture
of protecting “sweat equity” stakeholders from market depredation.321 As
noted in Section III.A, the best way to think about the HDFC is as a vehicle
combining the public company investor and stakeholder (“sweat equity”)
into one role, the shareholder. From this combination, the HDFC bridges
neoliberalism’s insistence on shareholder rights with communitarianism’s
focus on stakeholder protection.
In elaborating what culture means for corporate law, we must proceed
from the most essential part of any reform project: the role of the judiciary.
Corporate governance reform requires all participants, and investors
especially, to have an explicit role.322 This must be done for no other reason
than, as discussed above, relying on directors to benevolently exercise
discretion just will not do.323 Humankind are not angels; and so, we must
have governance by all.324 But investors can have a real role only if the
318. See Bodie, supra note 70, at 740.
319. See KRAAKMAN ET AL., supra note 38, § 1.5 (describing the goal of corporate

law as “to serve the interests of society as a whole”).
320. See Katz & Page, supra note 268, at 864, 869–70.
321. See McArdle, supra note 182, at 253–54.
322. See Katz & Page, supra note 268, at 864, 869–70. See generally infra note 347
(discussing the potential of benefit corporation statutes to make way for corporate
managers to “do the right thing”).
323. See Bodie, supra note 70, at 750–51.
324. This, of course, is the famous basis for both government and checks and balances
of government articulated in Federalist No. 51. See generally THE FEDERALIST NO. 51
(James Madison) (discussing the necessity for a “separate and distinct exercise of the
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judiciary aids them: that is the lesson of Apache. Corporate law reform
cannot continue to disregard this factor, or regard contracts including
corporate charters, as self-executing.
The misplaced confidence in contracts has led scholarship to regard the
“bad law” perpetuating extreme neoliberal governance — Dodge v. Ford325
and eBay Domestic Holdings, Inc. v. Newmark — as aberrations.326 But
another equally valid explanation is that these cases are indeed “the law” in
that they have effectively discouraged corporate boards from even trying
Henry Ford, Jim Buckmaster, and Craig Newmark’s brazen imposition of
communitarianism upon equity investors.327 If boards really had the power
to impose philanthropy, why are Dodge and eBay the only two cases of their
kind? Sure, law students are assigned cases about courts authorizing boards
to make minor philanthropic donations,328 but never ones with Dodge and
eBay facts and a different result. Consequently, it largely remains another
bit of theory, upon which the benefit corporation idea especially depends,
that the BJR goes so far as to protect directors in philanthropizing the
business corporation.329
different powers of government which . . . is . . . essential to the preservation of
liberty . . .”).
325. 170 N.W. 668 (Mich. 1919).
326. See Stout, Why We Should Stop Teaching Dodge v. Ford, supra note 18, at 166
(criticizing the reliance on Dodge v. Ford because the case is outdated and its most often
cited proposition is merely dicta); Katz & Page, supra note 268, at 864 (claiming that
new forms have been devised to avert outcomes caused by Dodge and eBay and
describing them as essentially the only two cases in a century where controllers lost).
327. See Reiser, Theorizing Forms for Social Enterprise, supra note 255, at 687–88
(citing anecdotal reports that secretaries of state will not accept certificates of
incorporation containing blended mission clauses and data suggesting that directors have
internalized the shareholder welfare maximization norm); Mark J. Roe, The Shareholder
Wealth Maximization Norm and Industrial Organization, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 2063, 2073
(2001) (“Norms in American business circles, starting with business school education,
emphasize the value, appropriateness, and indeed justice of maximizing shareholder
wealth . . . .”); Bainbridge, Director Primacy, supra note 34, at 575–76 (“Although some
scholars claim that directors do not adhere to the shareholder wealth maximization norm,
the weight of the evidence suggests the contrary. First, shareholder wealth maximization
is not only the law, but also is a basic feature of corporate ideology. A 1995 National
Association of Corporate Directors (NACD) report stated: ‘The primary objective of the
corporation is to conduct business activities with a view to enhancing corporate profit
and shareholder gain.’ A 1996 NACD report on director professionalism set out the same
objective, without any qualifying language on nonshareholder constituencies. A 1999
Conference Board survey found that directors of U.S. corporations generally define their
role as running the company for the benefit of its shareholders.”).
328. See Steinway v. Steinway & Sons, 40 N.Y.S. 718, 722 (Sup. Ct. 1896); A.P.
Smith Mfg. Co. v. Barlow, 98 A.2d 581, 589 (N.J. 1953); see also DIAMOND, supra note
159, at 15–20, 28–31.
329. Some corporate scholars claim this. See Katz & Page, supra note 268, at 868,
872 (citing Todd Henderson, Al Franken, Shareholder Wealth Maximization, and the
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Thus, the HDFC supplies what progressive corporate law has long
required to persuade: a concrete American example of effective and lasting
communitarianism to provoke salutary legal development. The closest
corporate law had to this was Ben & Jerry’s, mentioned above in Section
III.B in Solomon’s PCL essay,330 but its eventual acquisition by a publicly
traded company has, in the very least, complicated its communitarian
witness.331 So the HDFC, with its hybrid shareholder, is left to compel
judicial adoption of a legal realist approach toward corporate governance.
How that should work is discussed below.
Progressive reformers should use disputes involving HDFCs to urge
courts to review board decisions by considering the sort of business
corporation at issue, much like the U.S. Supreme Court did in the securities
law context with United Housing Foundation v. Forman.332 Where the
business corporation is like an HDFC, or one where investors rely on the
corporate form itself to enjoy the nonmonetary benefit of sovereign power
they would otherwise lack,333 the court should evaluate board action under
something akin to anti-discrimination law’s less burdensome standard.334
For a more apposite concretization of this, the approach advocated here
would universalize the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court’s approach in
Wilkes v. Springside Nursing Home, Inc.335 In that case, the court proceeded
from the type of business corporation at issue — a closely held one — and
fashioned a governance doctrine commensurate with such purpose.336
Specifically, the court held that because shareholders in closely held
corporations invest for the very purpose of enjoying guaranteed employment
Business Judgment Rule, PROFESSORBAINBRIDGE.COM (Jul. 27, 2020, 4:07 PM),
https://www.professorbainbridge.com/professorbainbridgecom/2010/07/shareholderwealth-maximization-and-the-business-judgment-rule.html); Reiser, Theorizing Forms
for Social Enterprise, supra note 255, at 686–87.
330. See Solomon, supra note 110, at 1642–43.
331. See Katz & Page, supra note 268, at 858–59 (citing their 2010 article about the
extinguishment of Ben & Jerry’s social benefits after Unilever acquired it but mentioning
that its capacity to grow after the acquisition produces other social benefits, such as
allowing Ben & Jerry’s to use hormone-free milk).
332. See supra notes 214–21 and accompanying text (discussing United Housing
Foundation, Inc. v. Forman).
333. See supra note 83 (discussing In re Kemp & Beatley and Ingle v. Glamore Motor
Sales).
334. Cf. 24 C.F.R. § 100.500 (2020) (asserting disparate impact analysis and its less
discriminatory effect standard in federal housing discrimination cases).
335. 353 N.E.2d 657, 659 (Mass. 1976).
336. See id. at 663 (citing Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co. of New England, Inc.,
328 N.E.2d 505, 511–12 (Mass. 1975)) (stating standard as “strict obligation on the part
of the majority stockholders in a close corporation to deal with the minority with the
utmost good faith and loyalty”).
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and other nonmonetary interests, a board infringing upon such rights must
pass heightened scrutiny.337 The board must adduce a legitimate business
purpose for the infringement. Once a corporation makes this showing, the
burden shifts to the challenging shareholder to show that the same legitimate
objective could have been achieved through means less harmful to her
interest.338
Applied to HDFCs, this test would produce heightened scrutiny curtailing
board tactics that drive out investors in a hot rental market, a tension in
gentrifying areas such as Brooklyn.339 For example, a board of an HDFC
would no longer be able to increase maintenance or costs at a rate the law
deems excessive or unconscionable340 without showing that there are
compelling reasons and no alternatives.
Lest we regard heightened scrutiny as some novelty in corporate law, it
has long existed in the mergers and acquisitions context. Neoliberalism had
long ago pushed courts to apply heightened scrutiny to such transactions
where shareholder profit is at stake. This more searching examination,
emerging from the Delaware Supreme Court’s decisions in Unocal Corp. v.
Mesa Petroleum Co.,341 Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings,
Inc.,342 and Paramount Communications Inc. v. QVC Network, Inc.,343 takes
the shareholder welfare maximization principle seriously to give it teeth.344
337. See id. (holding the strict standard set forth in Donahue applied to the instant
case).
338. See id. at 663 (emphasizing courts must consider the “practicability” of the less
harmful means asserted by minority shareholders in examining the action).
339. See Olear, supra note 170.
340. See, e.g., 303 W. 122nd St., HDFC v. Hussein, No. 570123/14, 2015 WL
753367, at *1 (N.Y. App. Term 2015) (remanding eviction case for new trial where trial
court dismissed eviction predicated on tenant’s refusal of a ninety-two percent rent
increase as unconscionable).
341. 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985).
342. 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986).
343. 637 A.2d 34 (Del. 1994).
344. See Unocal Corp., 493 A.2d at 958 (holding the “Court will not substitute its
judgment for that of the board”); Revlon Inc., 506 A.2d at 185 (holding “[t]he measures
were properly enjoined” and that the “board’s action [was] not entitled to the deference
accorded it by the business judgment rule”); Paramount Commc’ns Inc., 637 A.2d at 55
(“It is not appropriate for this Court to prescribe in the abstract any particular remedy or
to provide an exclusive list of remedies under such circumstances.”). I argue this despite
that, as Bainbridge points out, Unocal can legitimately be read to suggest that directors
may take the interests of other stakeholders into account in opposing a takeover (the
quintessential transaction involving shareholder wealth). See Bainbridge, Director
Primacy, supra note 34, at 583 n.176. However, the key here is that in all three decisions,
the court applied heightened scrutiny as a way of emphasizing the normative centrality
of shareholder welfare maximization. This jurisprudence is undoubtedly a key part of
why directors take shareholder welfare maximization so seriously.

132

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY BUSINESS LAW REVIEW

Vol. 10:1

For corporations formed to afford their owners a protective shield of power,
courts should apply the same heightened scrutiny to give those corporate
purposes bite.345
The HDFC, with its hybrid investor-sweat equity shareholder, also
unlocks progressive legislative reform. Inspired by the harm of neoliberal
governance on HDFCs, New York should amend the BCL to provide that for
corporations with shareholder compositions such as those of S corporations
— or ones made up of 100 or fewer natural people346 — any decision which
substantially affects shareholders’ rights is subject to shareholder
ratification.347 This change, serving to check director primacy as expressed
in BCL § 701, would harmonize the law in this way: just as shareholders
have a say on fundamental changes to certificates of incorporation348 or
terminal events such as mergers349 or dissolution,350 so too must their active
ones have a say in matters that effectively kill a corporation by undermining
its purpose and function. The obvious categories of matters that shareholders
should have to approve are decisions affecting voting procedures, decisions
to alienate or encumber corporate property, or decisions that would result in
increases to cooperative constituents’ costs in excess of a commercial
standard such as the consumer price index.
Having stated these legislative proposals, this Article cannot overstate the
importance of judicial reform. As Katharina Pistor’s example of property
rights and the Maya illustrates,351 the path to reform, and out of any
reductionist bog, is through a sea change to the judiciary’s approach to law,
a change especially important since all U.S. states regulate corporate
behavior through litigation rather than administrative rulemaking.352 What
345. Anticipating the next point, Unocal, Revlon, and Paramount are also instances
of judicial implying of purposes. Courts have taken the “any lawful business purpose”
idea and implied into it a purpose of maximizing return, at least in the auction context.
See Bainbridge, Director Primacy, supra note 34, at 548 (discussing the fiduciary
obligations of a corporation in maximizing shareholder wealth).
346. This could alternatively read 100 or fewer shareholders each of whom is a natural
person. See I.R.C. § 1361(b).
347. This accords with former Chief Justice of the Delaware Supreme Court Leo E.
Strine, Jr.’s observation, in support of the benefit corporation described above in Section
V.B, that it is incumbent upon corporate shareholders, and not directors, to enforce
corporate commitments to general social welfare. See Leo E. Strine, Jr., Making It Easier
for Directors to “Do the Right Thing”?, 4 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 235, 246–47 (2014).
348. N.Y. BUS. CORP. LAW § 803(a) (McKinney 2021).
349. Id. § 903.
350. Id. § 1001.
351. See KATHARINA PISTOR, THE CODE OF CAPITAL: HOW THE LAW CREATES
WEALTH AND INEQUALITY 24–29 (2019).
352. See CAN DELAWARE BE DETHRONED? EVALUATING THE DOMINANCE OF
CORPORATE LAW 10 (Stephen M. Bainbridge et al. eds., 2018).
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corporate law reform desperately requires is judicial acknowledgement of
that, illustrated by HDFCs, which progressive corporate scholars have long
contended:353 the existence of other types of economic rationality aside from
the relentless profit machine of Milton Friedman’s imagination.354 New
York’s standard business corporate law has long contained a corporate
constituent statute reciting the communitarian type of BJR that Millon
argues for in his PCL essay referenced above in Section III.A.355
Specifically, the statute grants directors, in rendering decisions for
corporations, the right to take other considerations into account aside from
shareholders and managers’ pockets.356 But under the current neoliberal
paradigm, disputes under these statutes have not even come up.357 This is
even true of the Indiana corporate constituent statute cited by one
commentator as evidence that existing corporate law already protects
corporations’ ability to pursue social aims.358
Because, throughout the United States’ legal systems, judges “say what
353. See discussion supra Section III.A.
354. See Eric Posner, Milton Friedman Was Wrong, ATLANTIC (Aug. 22, 2019),

https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2019/08/milton-friedman-shareholderwrong/596545 (criticizing Friedman’s shareholder theory as a method for corporations
to escape social responsibility for actions while increasing profits); see also Stout, Why
We Should Stop Teaching Dodge v. Ford, supra note 18, at 164 (citing Friedman, A
Friedman Doctrine, supra note 164) (explaining how taxation of shareholders for social
purposes is contrary to the duty of an agent to act in best interest of the principal); JOEL
BAKAN, THE CORPORATION: THE PATHOLOGICAL PURSUIT OF PROFIT AND POWER (2004)
(characterizing this shareholder welfare maximization — without regard to law, ethics,
or the interests of society — as a dangerous psychopathy).
355. See Millon, Communitarianism in Corporate Law, supra note 104, at 11.
356. See N.Y. BUS. CORP. LAW § 717(b) (McKinney 2021).
357. To elaborate, in Progressive Corporate Law (“PCL”) and back in 1995, Millon
notes, of these provisions, that “[s]ome of these statutes limit concern for
nonshareholders to management actions in defending against hostile turnovers, but most
apply generally to corporate decisionmaking. No one yet knows how state courts will
interpret these statutes or how corporate boards will respond to their mandate. On their
face, the statutes seem to herald a potentially radical departure from the traditional
shareholder primacy principle, but the statutes’ vagueness allows room for a range of
interpretive possibility.” Millon, Communitarianism in Corporate Law, supra note 104,
at 11–12. To date, no court has ever interpreted these statutes to have any force. This
includes Connecticut, the lone state identified by Millon as mandating the board to so
consider. See also DIAMOND, supra note 159, at 761 (noting that there is little case law
addressing these statutes and that none analyze what their substantive content requires).
358. See Katz & Page, supra note 268, at 868 (citing IND. CODE. ANN. § 23-1-35-1(d),
(g) (West 2021)). No court has yet to elaborate how subsections (d) and (g) apply. In
Murray v. Conseco, Inc., the Indiana Court of Appeals discussed these subsections in
connection with a board’s decision to remove a shareholder-appointed director. 766
N.E.2d 38, 44 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002). Tellingly, however, this opinion was then vacated
by the Indiana Supreme Court. See Murray v. Conseco, Inc., 795 N.E.2d 454, 462 (Ind.
2003).
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the law is,”359 no legislative standard has any reach apart from what judges
grant it. Indeed, anticipation of what judges will do discourages legal
challenge to the status quo. This is a long recognized problem: the
impossibility of legal reform absent a judiciary receptive and deferential to
social reality, as captured by litigants in Brandeis’ briefs or expressed in
legislative findings.360 Just as the judiciary finally came back to the world
as it is to recognize the unequal bargaining power necessitating regulation in
the name of social health,361 judges must accept that there are also business
corporations, such as HDFCs, formed to counter the unfettered operation of
markets. This cultural change will allow nonmonetary and counter-market
businesses to be given their intended force.
Finally, the legislative and judicial reforms discussed here would also
further progressive public company reform by opening up the legal mind to
its central claim. As discussed in Section III.B, the progressive corporate
law movement has suffered from its inability to frame business corporations
as serving goals other than shareholder profit. The implementation of the
reforms proposed here, based on the concrete case of the HDFC and the dual
role of the HDFC shareholder as a hybrid stakeholder-investor, would help
reorient law toward imagining the business corporation as also serving a
communitarian function, a corporate civic-mindedness emerging in the 2019
Business Roundtable’s recasting of a corporation’s purpose362 and New York

359. This famously comes from Marbury v. Madison: “It is emphatically the province
and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is. Those who apply the rule to
particular cases, must of necessity expound and interpret that rule. If two laws conflict
with each other, the courts must decide on the operation of each.” 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803).
360. See, e.g., FRIEDMAN, supra note 33, at 649; G. EDWARD WHITE, AMERICAN
LEGAL HISTORY: A VERY SHORT INTRODUCTION 39–40 (2013); cf. Javins v. First Nat’l
Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071, 1082 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (discarding caveat lessee and
adopting implied warranty of habitability).
361. See G. EDWARD WHITE, THE CONSTITUTION AND THE NEW DEAL 248–49 (2000)
(citing Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting)) (describing
the reasoning behind Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr’s dissent in Lochner — which
came to frame U.S. jurisprudence on economic regulation — that stated that economic
freedom is an illusion and heavily swayed by money, power, and politics).
362. Press Release, Bus. Roundtable, Business Roundtable Redefines the Purpose of
a Corporation to Promote ‘An Economy that Serves All Americans’ (Aug. 19, 2019),
https://www.businessroundtable.org/business-roundtable-redefines-the-purpose-of-acorporation-to-promote-an-economy-that-serves-all-americans; see also Andrew Ross
Sorkin, Has Business Left Milton Friedman Behind?, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 11, 2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/09/11/business/dealbook/milton-friedman-anniversarysorkin-essay.html.
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Times’ essay series revisiting363 Milton Friedman’s aforementioned op-ed364
on its fiftieth anniversary. From this emerging reorientation, the next step
will be for the law to recognize public company stakeholders as investors
also entitled to protection and participation, much like their HDFC
counterparts. Happily, in addition to those proposed by progressive
reformers,365 federal tax and securities law and other elements of the legal
code present possibilities for enforcing communitarian reform of public
companies.366
VII. CONCLUSION
Examining and historicizing the dominant neoliberalism governance
paradigm as well as the progressive challenges to it demonstrates that
corporate law reform must rely on the example Black and Brown economic
rationality — embodied by the HDFC — to be successful. As a business
corporation countering an aggressive market, the HDFC is a concrete, and
not merely conjectural, vehicle for compelling corporate law’s recognition
of nonmonetary communitarian rationality. As a result, using the HDFC can
produce judicial and legislative change that would free corporate governance
from neoliberal reduction to sustain corporations intentionally formed to
protect their stakeholders from markets.
It should not be surprising that corporate law can be enriched by Black
and Brown lived experiences. As discussed in the introduction, Nikole
Hannah-Jones’ acclaimed essay reveals how Black experiences have moved
United States constitutionalism toward universality and entelechy.367 We
should expect no different of corporate law. Especially in this moment
where the shameful absence of the Black perspectives in economics has

363. Greed Is Good. Except When It’s Bad, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 13, 2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/09/13/business/dealbook/milton-friedman-essayanniversary.html; see also Sorkin, supra note 362.
364. Friedman, A Friedman Doctrine, supra note 164.
365. See GREENFIELD, THE FAILURE OF CORPORATE LAW, supra note 33, at 115–16.
366. See Winkler, supra note 7, at 109–10; KRAAKMAN, supra note 38, § 3.3.2
(discussing the use of federal tax and securities laws as a tool inadvertently enhancing
executive pay by aligning it with company performance). Greenfield might bemuse to
see Kraakman’s text cited as a source for ideas on progressive law reform, given how
much Kraakman and Henry Hansmann are opposed to Greenfield’s principle reform of
empowering workers to join boards, following the German model. See GREENFIELD,
THE FAILURE OF CORPORATE LAW, supra note 33, at 15–17 (discussing Henry Hansmann
& Reinier Kraakman, The End of History for Corporate Law, 89 GEO. L.J. 439 (2001),
as criticizing, on efficiency grounds, the German model of worker-cooperative boards);
see also PISTOR, supra note 351, at 24–29.
367. See Hannah-Jones, supra note 21.
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become conspicuous,368 progressive proposals based on Black and Brown
economic rationality and experience can contribute to corporate reform.
Through such, and especially where recent scholarship has already identified
corporate power as an instrument for social activism,369 law students, public
interest lawyers, and jurists may find business corporate law to be an ally,
not a hindrance, to the struggle against second-class citizenship. If this is
achieved, corporate law would regain the social democratic function that it
long has had in American law,370 obscured in this neoliberal age.

368. See Ben Casselman & Jim Tankersley, Economics, Dominated by White Men, Is
Roiled by Black Lives Matter, N.Y. TIMES (June 10, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/
2020/06/10/business/economy/white-economists-black-lives-matter.html (exploring the
impact of underrepresentation of Black Americans in the field of economics and how the
history of discrimination in economics is relevant today).
369. See generally, e.g., Tom C.W. Lin, Incorporating Social Activism, 98 B.U. L.
REV. 1535 (2018) (providing a comprehensive account and framework for analysis of
using corporations to advance social activism); Stephen M. Bainbridge, Corporate
Purpose in a Populist Era, 98 NEB. L. REV. 543 (2020) (observing the use of corporate
power for progressive ends and predicting right-of-center workers’ reactions to it).
370. See generally Lamoreaux & Novak, supra note 33 (discussing the corporation’s
historic role in American democracy).

